Velmans (1992) questions the necessity of consciousness for mental functions, considering consciousness to be a state rather than a process i.e. a result rather than a cause. If the introspection of consciousness is the result of an episodic memory system that engages plans, the question of function loses much of its meaning. Only plan execution has a function, not its concomitant consciousness. If this conception of consciousness is a form of epiphenomenalism, so be it. Unlike the epiphenomenalism of traditional philosophy of mind, this epiphenomenalism echoes a real system with a real function. It is this epiphenomenon that defines our mental life.
1.2 None of the abilities that Velmans mentions in his para. 1.3 require consciousness in my (or in Mandler's 1975) conception, any more than any of the functions of an automobile requires driving. If the introspection of consciousness is the result of an episodic memory system that engages plans, the question of function loses much of its meaning. Only plan execution has a function, not its concomitant consciousness. The three alternative descriptions of the relation of consciousness to plans that Velmans quotes at the end of his para. 1.4 are synonymous in the context of action. Consciousness is not IN a plan, but is in the plan currently being executed, i. e. in an operation of articulation. This operation requires and addresses episodic memory, so that one later has access to the operation in language, and we say that a person can describe the actions and events of which he was aware. The feeling of self-consciousness, in this descriptive scheme, is a memory of the present that uses a distinct working memory. It has functions similar to memory of the past, but applies them to the current moment. But again, memory is something that you do, not something that you have (Bridgeman, 1988).
1.3 If this conception of consciousness is a form of epiphenomenalism, so be it. The word was dropped from the original target article because of its philosophical baggage, but an epiphenomenon need not be unimportant. And unlike the epiphenomenalism of traditional philosophy of mind, this epiphenomenalism echoes a real system with a real function. In this case it is the epiphenomenon that defines our mental life.
Bridgeman, B. (1988) The Biology of Behavior and Mind. Ch. 11: Memory. New York: Wiley.
Mandler, G. (1975) Mind and Emotion. New York: Wiley.
Velmans, M. (1991) Is human information processing conscious? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4): 651-669.
Velmans, Max (1992) Consciousness and Planning: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness. PSYCOLOQUY 3(34) consciousness.16