David J. Bryant (1992) How Many Spatial Systems?. Psycoloquy: 3(49) Space (8)

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PSYCOLOQUY (ISSN 1055-0143) is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA).
Psycoloquy 3(49): How Many Spatial Systems?

HOW MANY SPATIAL SYSTEMS?
Reply to Velichkovsky on Bryant on Space

David J. Bryant
Department of Psychology, 125 NI
Northeastern University
Boston, MA 02115
(617) 437-3548

bryant@northeastern.edu

Abstract

Although I agree with Velichkovsky (1992) on the need for multiple systems, I resist conceptualizing them as levels in a hierarchy. This implies a directionality in human thought and behavior, or, at least, that nonadjacent systems can communicate only through intermediate levels. The distinction I have drawn between perceptual, language, action, representation, memory, and metacognitive systems is not meant to reflect any dimension of processing. This distinction is based on what I see as different basic functions within the domain of spatial cognition - functions that do not necessarily lend themselves to a linear organization. Moreover, these systems are free to interact directly with one another as necessary to accomplish particular tasks. There must certainly be quite a bit of reciprocal communication between perceptual, language, memory, and metacognitive systems.

Keywords

Spacial representation, spacial models, cognitive maps, linguistic structure.
1.1 Velichkovsky (1992) argues that spatial cognition involves a number of systems rather than a single spatial representation system. Moreover, these systems are organized along a "vertical" continuum from sensory to metacognitive levels of functioning. This idea falls out of Velichkovsky's (1990) hierarchical model of human intelligence according to which there are six levels of cognitive processes. The first four levels direct interactions with the environment and are what might traditionally be termed sensory, perceptual, and motor processes. The upper two levels are involved in creating internal symbolic representations of the world and control the metacognitive functions that manipulate those representations. Any behavior, it is argued, involves processes at many of these levels and cannot be described as the result of any single system.

1.2 I believe that in this respect, the SRS account (Bryant 1992) is not very different from Velichkovsky's position. Spatial cognition is too broad to be accomplished by a single system or set of procedures. More than one system is necessary and Bryant (1992) did propose the use of several systems in spatial cognition. As originally conceived, the spatial representation system (SRS) was only one system involved in perceiving and thinking about space. Representing a perceived scene begins with analysis by the visual (or some other) perceptual system that passes information on to the SRS, which, in turn, constructs mental spatial models. Given a verbal description of an environment, we start with a language system that first analyses the linguistic input and then transmits information to the SRS. Thus, the SRS was never conceived of as a single system sufficient to handle all of spatial cognition from "start" to "finish." Rather, the SRS account shares Velichkovsky's multisystem view.

1.3 The perceptual and linguistic systems in the SRS act like Velichkovsky's (1990) level C (spatial field), performing orienting functions and gathering sensory information regarding spatial location. The SRS acts most like Velichkovsky's level E (conceptual structures), creating spatial models (memory images) and, to a certain extent, guiding the organization of spatial information for levels D (action) and C (spatial field and perception). The SRS also provides the spatial representations on which the metacognitive level (level F) operates.

1.4 Velichkovsky's analysis exposes where the SRS account is incomplete as a theory of spatial cognition. As put forth in Bryant (1992), it does not explain how spatial models are used to guide behavior or how they are manipulated to make spatial inferences or simulate changes to real or imagined environments. In Velichkovsky's (1990) terminology, there is no account of the action or metacognitive levels. Both are necessary for a theory that explains broader aspects of spatial cognition.

1.5 A complete specification of the SRS's role in spatial cognition would include action and metacognitive systems. In addition to receiving inputs from perceptual and language systems, the SRS must receive information from semantic memory (primarily to overcome the problem of underspecified descriptions) and a metacognitive system that guides planning, inference, and the use of spatial representations. Mental spatial models created by the SRS seem to be able to interact with perceptual systems, guiding the allocation of attention in perceived scenes (Logan 1991). They certainly interact with the language system because we are able to verbalize our representations of environments. Spatial models must also send input to an action system that guides movement and physical interaction with the environment. When we look at the larger domain of spatial cognition, involving perceiving, representing, manipulating, and acting in space, the SRS is clearly only one of the systems necessary to accomplish these related functions.

1.6 Although I agree with Velichkovsky (1992) on the need for multiple systems, I resist conceptualizing them as levels in a hierarchy. Such a hierarchy implies that there is a certain directionality in human thought and behavior, or, at least, that nonadjacent systems can communicate only through intermediate levels. The distinction I have drawn between perceptual, language, action, representation, memory, and metacognitive systems is not meant to reflect any dimension of processing (as in Velichkovsky's [1990] theory). This distinction is based on what I see as different basic functions within the domain of spatial cognition - functions that do not necessarily lend themselves to a linear organization. Moreover, these systems are free to interact directly with one another as necessary to accomplish particular tasks. There must certainly be quite a bit of reciprocal communication between perceptual, language, memory, and metacognitive systems.

REFERENCES

Bryant, D. J. (1992). A Spatial Representation System in Humans. PSYCOLOQUY 3(16) space.1.

Logan, G. D. (1991). Linguistic and Conceptual Control of Visual Spatial Attention. Paper presented at the 32nd annual meeting of the Psychonomic Society, San Francisco, CA.

Velichkovsky, B. M. (1990) The Vertical Dimension of Mental Functioning. Psychological Research, 52, 282-289.

Velichkovsky, B. M. (1992) The Spatial Representation System: A Single System of Perceptual-Verbal Access? PSYCOLOQUY 3(46) space.7.


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