Karl Haberlandt (1993) Understanding Mental Models and Inferences . Psycoloquy: 4(05) Reading Inference (6)
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Psycoloquy 4(05): Understanding Mental Models and Inferences

UNDERSTANDING MENTAL MODELS AND INFERENCES
Commentary on Garnham and on Glenberg & Mathew on Reading-Inference

Karl Haberlandt
Department of Psychology
Trinity College
Hartford CT 06107

Karl.Haberlandt@mail.trincoll.edu

Abstract

The two target articles defend mental models against the minimalist criticism that they are theoretically unnecessary empirically unsupported. Garnham and Glenberg & Mathew (G&M) make a strong case for mental models by specifying the conditions for constructing them and by challenging misconceptions attributed by McKoon & Ratcliff to mental models. In addition, G&M's study broadens the scope of previous results and reinforces their original mental-models theory. The critics of mental models must re-examine the salience notion, develop a formalism to handle the range of effects taken as support for mental models, and recast the minimalist-constructivist debate.

Keywords

constructionism, inference, mental models, minimalism, reading, text comprehension

References