Paul M.Pietroski (1993) Fodor Unscathed . Psycoloquy: 4(10) Fodor Representation (2)
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Psycoloquy 4(10): Fodor Unscathed

Commentary on Wallis on Fodor-Representation

Paul M.Pietroski
Philosophy Department
McGill University
Montreal PQ Canada


According to Wallis, philosophers of mind agree that a successful theory of representation must "describe conditions for representation in nonintentional and nonsemantic terms." Once beliefs are included as representations, there is no such agreement. Fodor's position is tendentious -- and therefore interesting -- precisely because he argues (a) that beliefs are representations (in a broad sense of the term) and (b) that the relation beliefs bear to their truth conditions can be characterized in nonsemantic terms. Fodor's theory may be flawed, but not for the reasons outline in Wallis' paper.


color vision, Fodor, mind/body problem, perception, representation, semantics, sensory transduction, verificationism