Paul M.Pietroski (1993) Fodor Unscathed
. Psycoloquy: 4(10) Fodor Representation (2)
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Psycoloquy 4(10): Fodor Unscathed
FODOR UNSCATHED
Commentary on Wallis on Fodor-Representation
Paul M.Pietroski
Philosophy Department
McGill University
Montreal PQ Canada
paul@philo.mcgill.ca
Abstract
According to Wallis, philosophers of mind agree that a
successful theory of representation must "describe conditions for
representation in nonintentional and nonsemantic terms." Once
beliefs are included as representations, there is no such
agreement. Fodor's position is tendentious -- and therefore
interesting -- precisely because he argues (a) that beliefs are
representations (in a broad sense of the term) and (b) that the
relation beliefs bear to their truth conditions can be
characterized in nonsemantic terms. Fodor's theory may be flawed,
but not for the reasons outline in Wallis' paper.
Keywords
color vision, Fodor, mind/body problem, perception,
representation, semantics, sensory transduction, verificationism
References
- Dretske, F. (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Fodor, J. (1990) A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Grice, P. (1957) "Meaning," Philosophical Review 66: 377-88.
- Loewer, B. and Rey, G. (eds.) (1991) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Wallis, C. (1992) Asymmetric Dependence and Mental Representation. PSYCOLOQUY 3(70) fodor-representation.1