Richard DeWitt (1993) Representation and the Foundations of Cognitive Science . Psycoloquy: 4(11) Fodor Representation (3)
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Psycoloquy 4(11): Representation and the Foundations of Cognitive Science

REPRESENTATION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Commentary on Wallis on Fodor-Representation

Richard DeWitt
Department of Philosophy
Fairfield University
Fairfield, CT 06430

rdewitt@fair1.fairfield.edu

Abstract

The focus of Wallis (1992) is a critique of Fodor's theory of mental representation. I discuss some foundational issues that Wallis has passed over too quickly. In particular (a) the importance of representation for Fodor's project and (b) some issues surrounding the role of representation in cognitive science in general. My point is that the lack of an acceptable account of mental representation is not just an idle puzzle but rather has important implications for foundational issues in cognitive science.

Keywords

cognitive science, Fodor, intentionality, mind/body problem, representation

References