MENTAL REPRESENTATION AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Reply to DeWitt and to Pietroski on Wallis on Fodor-Representation

Abstract

For Pietroski the relevant worry is over Gricean "non-natural" meaning he has not left Fodor unscathed, even on the assumption that Fodor need have nothing to say about my other cases. I would defend Fodor and his philosophy against Dewitt's charge that they consider mental representation "an idle puzzle". I also believe his worry that a lapse into circularity in the absence of an adequate definition of representation has occured is overstated.

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References

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