Antti Revonsuo (1993) Dennett and Dissociations of Consciousness . Psycoloquy: 4(59) Split Brain (4)
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Psycoloquy 4(59): Dennett and Dissociations of Consciousness

DENNETT AND DISSOCIATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain

Antti Revonsuo
Department of Philosophy and
Center for Cognitive Neuroscience
University of Turku
FIN-20500 Turku FINLAND

REVONSUO@sara.utu.fi

Abstract

I concur with Puccetti's criticism and argue that Dennett's multiple drafts theory cannot help us to understand any kinds of dissociations of consciousness. This is because the theory does not allow the distinction between real and apparent streams of consciousness. Such a distinction can be made on empirical grounds, however, with the help of empirically based accounts of consciousness.

Keywords

cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain.

References