Chris Mortensen, Gerard O'Brien & Belinda Paterson (1993) Distinctions: Subpersonal and Subconscious
. Psycoloquy: 4(62) Split Brain (5)
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Psycoloquy 4(62): Distinctions: Subpersonal and Subconscious
DISTINCTIONS: SUBPERSONAL AND SUBCONSCIOUS
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain
Chris Mortensen, Gerard O'Brien & Belinda Paterson
Department of Philosophy
University of Adelaide
North Terrace, South Australia
5001 Australia
cmortens@chomsky.adelaide.edu.au
gobrien@chomsky.adelaide.edu.au
Abstract
Puccetti argues that Dennett's views on split brains are
defective. First, we criticise Puccetti's argument. Then we
distinguish persons, minds, consciousnesses, selves and
personalities. Then we introduce the concepts of part-persons and
part-consciousnesses, and apply them to clarifying the situation.
Finally, we criticise Dennett for some contribution to the confusion.
Keywords
cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance,
consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality,
mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain.
References
- Dennett, D.C. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Mortensen, C. (1989) Mental Images: Should Cognitive Science Learn From Neurophysiology? in P. Slezack and W. Albury (eds) Computers, Brains and Minds. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Puccetti, R. (1973) Brain Bisection and Personal Identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24: 339-55.
- Puccetti, R. (1993) Dennett on the Split Brain. PSYCOLOQUY 4(52) split-brain.1.puccetti.