Craig R. M. McKenzie (1994) Base Rates Versus Prior Beliefs in Bayesian Inference . Psycoloquy: 5(01) Base Rate (6)
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Psycoloquy 5(01): Base Rates Versus Prior Beliefs in Bayesian Inference

BASE RATES VERSUS PRIOR BELIEFS IN BAYESIAN INFERENCE
Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate

Craig R. M. McKenzie
Department of Psychology
University of Chicago
Center for Decision Research
1101 E. 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637

fac_mckenzie@gsbvax.uchicago.edu

Abstract

The distinction between prior beliefs and base rates is often blurred in the literature on judgment and decision making and can account for some apparently contradictory conclusions regarding behavior in Bayesian tasks.

Keywords

Base rate fallacy, Bayes' theorem, decision making, ecological validity, ethics, fallacy, judgment, probability.

References