David S. Webster (1994) Collingwood and Vygotsky on Consciousness
. Psycoloquy: 5(22) Split Brain (8)
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Psycoloquy 5(22): Collingwood and Vygotsky on Consciousness
Collingwood and Vygotsky on Consciousness
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-brain
David S. Webster
Department of Psychology
University of Durham
Durham, UK
D.S.Webster@durham.ac.uk
Abstract
Both Collingwood and Vygotsky take consciousness to be
the reflexive consequence of the structure of activity. The most
important activity related to human consciousness is speech -- the
source of narrative consciousness. Dennett's "multiple drafts" may
be best understood as an aspect of the reflexivity of speech.
Puccetti is right about the dangers of placing too much emphasis on
"narrative richness" as a criterion for personhood and thereby, the
right to life.
Keywords
cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance,
consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality,
mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain.
References
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- Blackburn, S. (1992) Theory, Observation and Drama. Mind & Language; 7 (1&2) 187-203.
- Collingwood, R.G. (1916) Religion and Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Collingwood, R.G. (1933) An Essay on Philosophical Method. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Collingwood, R.G. (unpublished MS, 1936) Notes on the History of Historiography and Philosophy of History. In W.J. van der Dussen (1981) History as Science: The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. Martinus Nijhoff.
- Collingwood, R.G. (1958) The Principles of Art. Oxford University Press.
- Dennett, D.C. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Puccetti, R. (1993) Dennett on the Split-Brain. PSYCOLOQUY 4 (52) split-brain.1.puccetti.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1979) Consciousness as a Problem in the Psychology of Behavior. Soviet Psychology ; XVII (4) 3-35.
- Wartofsky, M.W. (1979) Towards a Critical Materialism. In Robert S. Cohen and Mark Wartofsky (eds.), Models: Representation and the Scientific Understanding. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science; 129.