WHY WE SHOULD NOT RELY ON COGNITIVE SCIENCE
TO UNIFY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition

Abstract

Contrary to Ronald Giere's hope, enlisting the cognitive sciences to play a role filled by logic and history will not bring about programmatic unity in the philosophy of science (Giere, 1992, 1993). I consider two such possible roles and conclude by questioning the assumption that programmatic unity is in and of itself a desirable goal.

Keywords

References

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