Selmer Bringsjord (1995) Why Didn't Evolution Produce Turing Test-passing Zombies? . Psycoloquy: 6(19) Robot Consciousness (12)
Versions: ASCII formatted
Psycoloquy 6(19): Why Didn't Evolution Produce Turing Test-passing Zombies?

WHY DIDN'T EVOLUTION PRODUCE TURING TEST-PASSING ZOMBIES?
Reply to Tirassa on Robot-Consciousness

Selmer Bringsjord
Dept. of Philosophy, Psychology & Cognitive Science
Department of Computer Science
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy NY 12180 (USA)

selmer@rpi.edu

Abstract

Tirassa agrees that we can now safely conclude, on the strength of arguments like those given by myself (1992, 1994a) and Searle (1992), that computational systems cannot be conscious. He then takes us to what I see as the heart of the matter, by asking: Given that consciousness is more than computation, what exactly is the relationship between consciousness and computation in human and artificial agents? Put starkly, why didn't evolution produce zombies, creatures having our behavioral capacity (which can presumably be reached by a mere computational system) but lacking consciousness? I make four points concerning Tirassa's eloquent treatment of this fundamental and fascinating question.

Keywords

behaviorism, Chinese Room Argument, cognition, consciousness, finite automata, free will, functionalism, introspection, mind, story generation, Turing machines, Turing Test.

References