Selmer Bringsjord (1995) Agnosticism Re-revisited
. Psycoloquy: 6(30) Robot Consciousness (16)
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Psycoloquy 6(30): Agnosticism Re-revisited
AGNOSTICISM RE-REVISITED
Reply to Brown and O'Rourke on Robot-Consciousness
Selmer Bringsjord
Dept. of Philosophy, Psychology & Cognitive Science
Department of Computer Science
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy NY 12180 (USA)
http://www.rpi.edu/~brings
selmer@rpi.edu
Abstract
Brown and O'Rourke (1995) state that their argument
against my first version of the Arbitrary Realization Argument
(ARA1) is based on a rule of inference other than the ones I
previously (1995) showed to be fallacious. Unfortunately, their
argument is not based on this new rule. The rule of inference they
do deploy implies that their argument has at least one false
premise.
Keywords
behaviorism, Chinese Room Argument, cognition,
consciousness, finite automata, free will, functionalism,
introspection, mind, story generation, Turing machines, Turing
Test.
References
- Bringsjord, S. (1992) What Robots Can and Can't Be. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Bringsjord, S. (1994) Precis of: What Robots Can and Can't Be. PSYCOLOQUY 5(59) robot-consciousness.1.bringsjord.
- Bringsjord, S. (1995) Agnosticism About Neuron-Level Functionalism. PSYCOLOQUY 6(20) robot-consciousness.13.bringsjord.
- Brown, M. & O'Rourke, J. (1994) Agnosticism About the Arbitrary Realization Argument. PSYCOLOQUY 5(83) robot-consciousness.3.brown.
- Brown, M. & O'Rourke, J. (1995) Agnosticism Revisited. PSYCOLOQUY 6(21) robot-consciousness.14.brown.
- Cole, D. & Foelber, R. (1984) Contingent Materialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65.1: 74-85.