Jack R. Adams-Webber (1995) A Pragmatic Constructivist Gambit for Cognitive Scientists
. Psycoloquy: 6(34) Human Choice (2)
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Psycoloquy 6(34): A Pragmatic Constructivist Gambit for Cognitive Scientists
A PRAGMATIC CONSTRUCTIVIST GAMBIT FOR COGNITIVE SCIENTISTS
Commentary on Lefebvre on Human-Choice
Jack R. Adams-Webber
Department of Psychology
Brock University
St. Catharines, Ontario
Canada L2S 3A1
jadams@spartan.ac.brocku.ca
Abstract
It is argued that it makes epistemological sense for
cognitive scientists to adopt the pragmatic constructivist strategy
pursued by Lefebvre (1995). The intent is to identify formal
principles which can impose logical constraints on the construction
of computational models applicable to specific psychological
problems such as, in the case of Lefebvre's own research, the
prediction of human choice behavior.
Keywords
choice; computation; decision theory; ethical cognition;
mathematical psychology; model building; parameter estimation;
probability; rationality.
References
- Adams-Webber, J. (1993). The robot's designer's dilemma. American Journal of Psychology, 106, 300-303.
- Hawking, S.W. (1988). A brief history of time: From the big bang to black holes. New York: Bantam.
- Hayes, P.J., Ford, K.M. & Adams-Webber, J. (1994). Human Reasoning About Artificial Intelligence. In E. Dietrich (Ed.), Thinking computers and virtual persons: Essays on the intentionality of machines (pp. 331-353). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Lefebvre, V. A. (1985). The golden section and an algebraic model of ethical cognition. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 29, 289-310.
- Lefebvre, V.A. (1992). A rational equation of attractive proportions. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 36, 100-128.
- Lefebvre, V.A. (1995). The Anthropic Principle in Psychology and Human Choice. PSYCOLOQUY 6(29) human-choice.1.lefebvre.
- Miles, M. (1986). Kant and the synthetic a priori. University of Toronto Quarterly, 55, 172-184.
- Penrose, R. (1989). The emperor's new mind. New York: Oxford.
- Von Wright, G.H. (1966). The paradoxes of confirmation. In J. Hintikka & P. Suppes (Eds.), Aspects of inductive logic (pp. 208-218). Amsterdam: North Holland.