THE ROLE OF IMPLEMENTATION IN CONNECTIONIST EXPLANATION
Commentary on Green on Connectionist-Explanation

Abstract

Green is right to question the explanatory role of connectionist models in cognitive science. What is more, he is generally right in his judgement that the only way of interpreting connectionist models as theories of cognitive phenomena is by construing them as "literal models of brain activity" (1998, para. 20). This is because connectionist explanations of cognitive phenomena are more dependent on details of implementation than their conventional ("classical") counterparts.

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References

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