Christopher D. Green (1998) Higher Functional Properties do not Solve Connectionism's Problems . Psycoloquy: 9(25) Connectionist Explanation (22)
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Psycoloquy 9(25): Higher Functional Properties do not Solve Connectionism's Problems

HIGHER FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES DO NOT SOLVE CONNECTIONISM'S PROBLEMS
Reply to Goldsmith on Connectionist-Explanation

Christopher D. Green
Department of Psychology
York University
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
http://www.yorku.ca/faculty/academic/christo

christo@yorku.ca

Abstract

Goldsmith (1998) argues that I (Green 1998a) am wrong in asserting that nodes and connections are the theoretical entities of connectionist theories. I reply that if he is right, then connectionist theory is not connectionist after all. I also comment briefly on Seidenberg's (1993) approach to the interpretation of connectionist research, and on the issue of the proper distinction to be drawn between theories and models.

Keywords

artificial intelligence, cognition, computer modelling, connectionism, epistemology, explanation, methodology, neural nets, philosophy of science, theory.

References