| Title & Author | Abstract | |
|---|---|---|
| 12(018) | MIND, MEANING & MENTAL DISORDER: THE NATURE OF CAUSAL
EXPLANATION IN PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY [Oxford University Press 1996, ISBN 0-19-262936-0] Precis of D.Bolton & J.Hill on Mental-Disorder Derek Bolton & Jonathan Hill Dr. Derek Bolton Institue of Psychiatry London Prof. Jonathan Hill Department of Psychiatry Royal Liverpool Children's Hospital Liverpool d.bolton@iop.kcl.ac.uk jonathan.hill@liverpool.ac.uk |
Abstract:
The book proposes a new analysis of mental causation and
applies it to the problem of mental disorder and its etiology. The
proposed analysis grounds mental causation in information-
processing, which characterizes not only mental but also biological
functions. It involves driving Brentano's thesis downwards, with
the argument that biological processes have (genuine)
intentionality and that there is a seamless transition through
developmental biology and psychology to mature human cognition.
This is primarily a philosophical and conceptual case, drawing on
examples from biological and psychological research. It aims to
provide a justification for, and explicit statement of the
implications of, assumptions that are already commonplace in the
behavioural and neurosciences. In contrast with current
philosophical analyses of the role of intentionality in behaviour,
the analysis shows how the conditions for intentionality in the
normal case contain the conditions for disordered functioning.
These proposals are worked out in relation to major areas of
psychopathology, including depression, anxiety disorders,
schizophrenia, and personality disorders.
Keywords: intentionality, mental disorder, causal explanation, theory of mind, functional semantics, psychiatry |
| 13(015) | MIND, MEANING AND CAUSE: SO WHAT IF THE MIND DOESN'T FIT IN THE HEAD
Book Review of Bolton & Hill on Mental Disorder Richard Griffin Departments of Experimental Psychology & Psychiatry University of Cambridge, UK 18B Trumpington Road Cambridge, CB2 2AH rg238@cam.ac.uk |
Abstract:
This review of Bolton & Hill's (B&H) Mind, Meaning, &
Mental Disorder examines their non-reductionist yet realist
position on mental content. Their arguments are compared to the
writings of Dennett and Millikan, where determining function is
central to determining information-processing capabilities. The
normative nature of function (malfunction) is considered as is its
relation to mental states more broadly. Their Wittgensteinian view
of meaning as action is accepted as insightful and useful, though
some questions remain about their theory of meaning and its
applicability to psychological phenomena.
Keywords: meaning, function, normativity, intentionality, cause, reduction |
| 13(018) | MENTAL DISORDER AND ITS CAUSE
Book Review of Bolton and Hill on Mental Disorder Alan C. Clune Department of Philosophy University at Buffalo The State University of New York Buffalo, New York 14260 USA clunea@netscape.net |
Abstract:
Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill have embarked on an
ambitious project with the purpose of arguing for the necessity of
retaining both psychological and psychiatric sorts of explanations
for mental disorder. This includes arguing for two distinct kinds
of causation. These two kinds of causation are sometimes both
required in order to explain mental disorder. In the following
review I first attempt to sketch their overall project. Then I
offer a criticism of their view that two notions of causality are
needed in order to properly explain mental disorder.
Keywords: mental disorder, causality, intentionality, reduction, psychology, psychiatry, meaning, function |
| 13(025) | THE ROLE OF ENCODED INFORMATION IN EXPLANATION
Reply to Griffin and Clune on Bolton and Hill on Mental Disorder Derek Bolton Psychology Department Institute of Psychiatry London SE5 8AF U.K. Jonathan Hill University Child Mental Health Royal Liverpool Children's Hospital Mulberry House Eaton Road Liverpool L12 2AP U.K. d.bolton@iop.kcl.ac.uk jonathan.hill@liverpool.ac.uk |
Abstract:
In their reviews of Bolton and Hill (1996) (MMMD) Griffin
(2002) and Clune (2002) identify some potential problems. Griffin
points out that some aspects of folk psychology may turn out to be
unsupported by the science. Generally, however, MMMD does not rely
on folk psychology, and indeed its theory of intentionality is
explicitly applied to biological systems not only psychological,
where folk or any other psychological concepts would be out of
place. Clune suggests that the evolutionary analysis together with
advancing knowledge and technology may make the concept of
intentionality redundant. We reply that the case for intentional
causality is embedded in an evolutionary perspective and that the
case for intentionality in biological systems does not depend on
inadequate knowledge.
Keywords: mental disorder, causality, intentionality, meaning, reduction |