Summary of PSYCOLOQUY topic Part Whole Perception

Topic:
Title & AuthorAbstract
8(13) SOME REMARKS ON WHOLES, PARTS AND THEIR PERCEPTION
Target Article be Latimer on Part-Whole-Perception
Cyril Latimer
Department of Psychology
University of Sydney
NSW 2006, Australia
URL: http://www.psych.su.oz.au/staff/cyril/

Catherine Stevens
Department of Psychology/FASS
University of Western Sydney, Macarthur
PO Box 555, Campbelltown, NSW 2560, Australia
URL: http://psy.uq.edu.au/CogPsych/Noetica/

cyril@psych.su.oz.au kj.stevens@uws.edu.au
Abstract: We emphasize the relativity of wholes and parts in whole/part perception, and suggest that consideration must be given to what the terms "whole" and "part" mean, and how they relate in a particular context. A formal analysis of the part/whole relationship by Rescher & Oppenheim, (1955) is shown to have a unifying and clarifying role in many controversial issues including illusions, emergence, local/global precedence, holistic/analytic processing, schema/feature theories and "smart mechanisms". The logic of direct extraction of holistic properties is questioned, and attention drawn to vagueness of reference to wholes and parts which can refer to phenomenal units, physiological structures or theoretical units of perceptual analysis.

Keywords: analytic versus holistic processing, emergence, feature gestalt, global versus local precedence part, whole

9(01) PERCEPTUAL COGNITION, PARTS AND WHOLES
Commentary on Latimer & Stevens on Part-Whole-Perception
Chris Mortensen
Department of Philosophy
The University of Adelaide
North Tce, SA 5005 Australia

cmortens@arts.adelaide.edu.au
Abstract: Latimer & Stevens (1997) make a persuasive case that attending to the conceptual analysis of the part-whole relation clarifies some of the issues surrounding perceptual gestalts. Several disagreements are registered here. Their account of the part-whole relation is stronger than they need to make their points work.

Keywords: analytic versus holistic processing, emergence, feature gestalt, global versus local precedence part, whole

9(02) CAN MECHANISTIC EXPLANATORY CONCEPTS BE APPLIED TO PART-WHOLE
PERCEPTION?
Commentary on Latimer & Stevens on Part-Whole-Perception
Sam S. Rakover
Department of Psychology
Haifa University
Haifa, Israel 31905

rakover@psy.haifa.ac.il
Abstract: Latimer & Stevens (1997) propose making order out of the prevailing disorder surrounding the terms "whole" and "part" by applying a conceptual framework developed by Rescher & Oppenheim (1955). The basic argument of the present commentary is that this framework is not suitable to explain the perception of part-whole because it is nothing other than a reflection and formalization of the physical system, which differs fundamentally from the system of human behavior. Whereas physical properties are founded on basic and natural units of measurement, psychological properties are not based on such measurement units.

Keywords: explanation, measurement units, mereology, part, scheme, whole.

9(03) THE TOPOLOGY OF WHOLES, PARTS AND THEIR PERCEPTION-COGNITION
Commentary on Latimer & Stevens on Part-Whole-Perception
William C. Hoffman,
2591 W. Camino Llano
Tucson, Arizona
USA, 85742-9074

wilhof@primenet.com
Abstract: The Latimer & Stevens (1997) target article on wholes, parts, and their perception is analyzed and extended on the basis of topology involved in the Lie transformation group theory of neuropsychology and the symmetric difference model for cognition.

Keywords: topology, symmetry, transformation groups, invariance, dialectical psychology

9(31) WHOLES AND PARTS: TOPOLOGY, MEREOLOGY AND MECHANISM
Replies to Hoffman, Mortensen and Rakover
on Part-Whole-Perception
Cyril Latimer
Department of Psychology
University of Sydney
NSW 2006, Australia
http://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/cyril/

Catherine Stevens
Department of Psychology/FASS
University of Western Sydney, Macarthur
PO Box 555, Campbelltown, NSW 2560, Australia
http://fassweb.macarthur.uws.edu.au/MACL/

cyril@psych.usyd.edu.au kj.stevens@uws.edu.au
Abstract: Hoffman (1998) and Mortensen (1998) do not appear to be in disagreement with our general remarks on wholes and parts; they extend discussion on relevant issues. We challenge Mortensen's claim that our position is not general by asking for examples of wholes that fail in any sense to conform to the Rescher & Oppenheim (1955) conditions. We argue against his view that there is no need to be over-concerned about the conditions under which an object X is to be considered as a part of object Y since the classical part-whole relation is invariant with respect to decomposition. We remain unconvinced by Rakover's (1998) argument that a mechanistic approach to whole-part perception cannot be taken because psychology necessarily lacks the measurement precision of the physical sciences. We challenge this view, but also suggest that inability to measure with precision is no excuse for the proliferation in psychology of vague, imprecise and ill-defined notions of wholes and parts.

Keywords: analytic versus holistic processing, emergence, feature gestalt, global versus local precedence part, whole

10(021) GESTALT THEORIES OF COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION & PROCESSING
Commentary on Latimer & Stevens on Part-Whole-Perception
Jonathan Opie
Department of Philosophy
The University of Adelaide
South Australia 5005
http://chomsky.arts.adelaide.edu.au/Philosophy/jopie.htm

jon.opie@adelaide.edu.au
Abstract: Latimer & Stevens (1997) develop a useful framework for discussing issues surrounding the definition and explanation of perceptual Gestalts. They use this framework to raise some doubts about the possibility of "holistic" perceptual processing. However, I suspect that these doubts ultimately stem from assumptions about the nature of representation and processing in the brain, rather than from an analysis of part/whole concepts. I attempt to spell out these assumptions, and sketch an alternative perspective (deriving from Gestalt theory) that has the potential to make sense of holism in perception.

Keywords: Gestalt theory, extrinsic/intrinsic representation, connectionism

10(041) INTRINSIC REPRESENTATIONS:
SIMULTANEITY OF LOCAL AND GLOBAL PROCESSING?
Reply to Opie on Part-Whole-Perception
Cyril Latimer
Department of Psychology
University of Sydney
NSW 2006 Australia
http://www.psych.usyd.edu.ay/staff/cyril

Catherine Stevens
Department of Psychology/FASS,
University of Western Sydney
PO Box 555, Campbelltown
NSW 2560 Australia
http://www.macarthur.uws.edu.au/marcs

cyril@psych.usyd.edu.au kj.stevens@uws.edu.au
Abstract: Opie (1999) suggests that our our claim that there must be prior local analysis in part-whole processing stems, not from our suggestions about whole/part analysis, but from our assuming extrinsic rather than intrinsic representations. He argues that the assumption of intrinsic representation in the brain allows an escape from the need for prior local analysis and offers a framework for simultaneous, parallel processing of local and global properties of patterns. We challenge his claim and demonstrate how, on Opie's connectionist examples of intrinsic representation, and from what we know about the real visual system, the need for prior local analysis is evident.

Keywords: connectionism, extrinsic/extrinsic representation, Gestalt theory, wholes and parts