Title & Author | Abstract | |
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8(13) | SOME REMARKS ON WHOLES, PARTS AND THEIR PERCEPTION
Target Article be Latimer on Part-Whole-Perception Cyril Latimer Department of Psychology University of Sydney NSW 2006, Australia URL: http://www.psych.su.oz.au/staff/cyril/ Catherine Stevens Department of Psychology/FASS University of Western Sydney, Macarthur PO Box 555, Campbelltown, NSW 2560, Australia URL: http://psy.uq.edu.au/CogPsych/Noetica/ cyril@psych.su.oz.au kj.stevens@uws.edu.au |
Abstract:
We emphasize the relativity of wholes and parts in
whole/part perception, and suggest that consideration must be given
to what the terms "whole" and "part" mean, and how they relate in a
particular context. A formal analysis of the part/whole
relationship by Rescher & Oppenheim, (1955) is shown to have a
unifying and clarifying role in many controversial issues including
illusions, emergence, local/global precedence, holistic/analytic
processing, schema/feature theories and "smart mechanisms". The
logic of direct extraction of holistic properties is questioned,
and attention drawn to vagueness of reference to wholes and parts
which can refer to phenomenal units, physiological structures or
theoretical units of perceptual analysis.
Keywords: analytic versus holistic processing, emergence, feature gestalt, global versus local precedence part, whole |
9(01) | PERCEPTUAL COGNITION, PARTS AND WHOLES
Commentary on Latimer & Stevens on Part-Whole-Perception Chris Mortensen Department of Philosophy The University of Adelaide North Tce, SA 5005 Australia cmortens@arts.adelaide.edu.au |
Abstract:
Latimer & Stevens (1997) make a persuasive case that
attending to the conceptual analysis of the part-whole relation
clarifies some of the issues surrounding perceptual gestalts.
Several disagreements are registered here. Their account of the
part-whole relation is stronger than they need to make their points
work.
Keywords: analytic versus holistic processing, emergence, feature gestalt, global versus local precedence part, whole |
9(02) | CAN MECHANISTIC EXPLANATORY CONCEPTS BE APPLIED TO PART-WHOLE
PERCEPTION? Commentary on Latimer & Stevens on Part-Whole-Perception Sam S. Rakover Department of Psychology Haifa University Haifa, Israel 31905 rakover@psy.haifa.ac.il |
Abstract:
Latimer & Stevens (1997) propose making order out of the
prevailing disorder surrounding the terms "whole" and "part" by
applying a conceptual framework developed by Rescher & Oppenheim
(1955). The basic argument of the present commentary is that this
framework is not suitable to explain the perception of part-whole
because it is nothing other than a reflection and formalization of
the physical system, which differs fundamentally from the system of
human behavior. Whereas physical properties are founded on basic
and natural units of measurement, psychological properties are not
based on such measurement units.
Keywords: explanation, measurement units, mereology, part, scheme, whole. |
9(03) | THE TOPOLOGY OF WHOLES, PARTS AND THEIR PERCEPTION-COGNITION
Commentary on Latimer & Stevens on Part-Whole-Perception William C. Hoffman, 2591 W. Camino Llano Tucson, Arizona USA, 85742-9074 wilhof@primenet.com |
Abstract:
The Latimer & Stevens (1997) target article on wholes,
parts, and their perception is analyzed and extended on the basis
of topology involved in the Lie transformation group theory of
neuropsychology and the symmetric difference model for cognition.
Keywords: topology, symmetry, transformation groups, invariance, dialectical psychology |
9(31) | WHOLES AND PARTS: TOPOLOGY, MEREOLOGY AND MECHANISM
Replies to Hoffman, Mortensen and Rakover on Part-Whole-Perception Cyril Latimer Department of Psychology University of Sydney NSW 2006, Australia http://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/cyril/ Catherine Stevens Department of Psychology/FASS University of Western Sydney, Macarthur PO Box 555, Campbelltown, NSW 2560, Australia http://fassweb.macarthur.uws.edu.au/MACL/ cyril@psych.usyd.edu.au kj.stevens@uws.edu.au |
Abstract:
Hoffman (1998) and Mortensen (1998) do not appear to be
in disagreement with our general remarks on wholes and parts; they
extend discussion on relevant issues. We challenge Mortensen's
claim that our position is not general by asking for examples of
wholes that fail in any sense to conform to the Rescher &
Oppenheim (1955) conditions. We argue against his view that there
is no need to be over-concerned about the conditions under which
an object X is to be considered as a part of object Y since the
classical part-whole relation is invariant with respect to
decomposition. We remain unconvinced by Rakover's (1998) argument
that a mechanistic approach to whole-part perception cannot be
taken because psychology necessarily lacks the measurement
precision of the physical sciences. We challenge this view, but
also suggest that inability to measure with precision is no excuse
for the proliferation in psychology of vague, imprecise and
ill-defined notions of wholes and parts.
Keywords: analytic versus holistic processing, emergence, feature gestalt, global versus local precedence part, whole |
10(021) | GESTALT THEORIES OF COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION & PROCESSING
Commentary on Latimer & Stevens on Part-Whole-Perception Jonathan Opie Department of Philosophy The University of Adelaide South Australia 5005 http://chomsky.arts.adelaide.edu.au/Philosophy/jopie.htm jon.opie@adelaide.edu.au |
Abstract:
Latimer & Stevens (1997) develop a useful framework for
discussing issues surrounding the definition and explanation of
perceptual Gestalts. They use this framework to raise some doubts
about the possibility of "holistic" perceptual processing. However,
I suspect that these doubts ultimately stem from assumptions about
the nature of representation and processing in the brain, rather
than from an analysis of part/whole concepts. I attempt to spell
out these assumptions, and sketch an alternative perspective
(deriving from Gestalt theory) that has the potential to make sense
of holism in perception.
Keywords: Gestalt theory, extrinsic/intrinsic representation, connectionism |
10(041) | INTRINSIC REPRESENTATIONS:
SIMULTANEITY OF LOCAL AND GLOBAL PROCESSING? Reply to Opie on Part-Whole-Perception Cyril Latimer Department of Psychology University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia http://www.psych.usyd.edu.ay/staff/cyril Catherine Stevens Department of Psychology/FASS, University of Western Sydney PO Box 555, Campbelltown NSW 2560 Australia http://www.macarthur.uws.edu.au/marcs cyril@psych.usyd.edu.au kj.stevens@uws.edu.au |
Abstract:
Opie (1999) suggests that our our claim that there must
be prior local analysis in part-whole processing stems, not from
our suggestions about whole/part analysis, but from our assuming
extrinsic rather than intrinsic representations. He argues that the
assumption of intrinsic representation in the brain allows an escape
from the need for prior local analysis and offers a framework for
simultaneous, parallel processing of local and global properties of
patterns. We challenge his claim and demonstrate how, on Opie's
connectionist examples of intrinsic representation, and from what
we know about the real visual system, the need for prior local
analysis is evident.
Keywords: connectionism, extrinsic/extrinsic representation, Gestalt theory, wholes and parts |