| Title & Author | Abstract | |
|---|---|---|
| 4(56) | COGNITIVE MODELS OF SCIENCE
[Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, volume 15. Ronald N. Giere (ed.) 1992 20 Chapters, 508 pgs. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press] Precis of Giere on Scientific-Cognition Ronald N. Giere Department of Philosophy and Center for Philosophy of Science University of Minnesota Minneapolis MN 55455 PHILOSCI@vx.cis.umn.edu |
Abstract:
Cognitive sciences have reached a sufficient state of
maturity that they can now provide a valuable resource for
philosophers of science who are developing general theories of
science as a human activity. Three disciplinary clusters are
distinguised: (i) Artificial Intelligence (itself a branch of
computer science), (ii) Cognitive Psychology, and (iii) Cognitive
Neuroscience. Each of these clusters provides a group of models
that might be deployed in approaching problems that are central to
the philosophy of science.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 4(65) | GEOMETRY AS COGNITION IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES
Commentary on Giere on Science-Cognition Fred L. Bookstein Center for Human Growth and Development University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 (313) 764-2443 fred@brainmap.med.umich.edu |
Abstract:
The cognitive models of science surveyed in the Giere
(1992) volume appear to ignore apperception of "geometrical" data
-- locations and displacements in the real space of gauges or
photographs. Disregard of this channel entails a serious
underweighting of abductive reasoning and of the force of
quantitative anomalies or surprisingly accurate predictions in
accounts of the rhetoric of the natural sciences.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(07) | COGNITIVE SCIENTISM OF SCIENCE
Commentary on Giere on Science-Cognition J. van Brakel Department of Philosophy University of Utrecht P.O. Box 80.126 3508 TC Utrecht (The Netherlands) brakel@phil.ruu.nl |
Abstract:
In this review of Cognitive Models of Science (CSS, Giere
1992), I express skepticism about its ability to (dis)solve all
foundational issues concerning science and suggest that CSS would
do better to redirect its attention to the foundational problems
that beset cognitive science itself. Not only CSS but the social
and philosophical approaches to science too are, in their extreme
forms, caricatures, based on the same scientistic model. What is
needed instead is a recognition of the priority of the Manifest
Image over the Scientific Image.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(30) | WHAT CAN INSIDERS LEARN FROM OUTSIDERS?
Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition Michael G. Shafto Aerospace Human Factors Research Division Mail Stop 262-1, NASA-Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000 shafto@eos.arc.nasa.gov |
Abstract:
Cognitive models enhance the analysis of the work
processes of scientists. The same kinds of models may inform
analyses of the cognitive processes of nonexperts learning how to
"do" science. If successful, such a program of research could not
only enrich cognitive theory, but also guide new developments in
science education.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(39) | INFORMATION, COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR:
TELLING WHAT THEY WANT TO HEAR Book Review of Giere on Scientific Cognition A. Charles Catania Department of Psychology University of Maryland, Baltimore County Baltimore, MD 21228-5398 catania@umbc2.umbc.edu |
Abstract:
My review of Giere's Cognitive Models of Science (1992)
is written from the standpoint of contemporary behavior analysis.
Science is an activity, so what we know about behavior should be
relevant to it. Yet cognitive approaches do not take facts about
behavior into account. The themes I consider include the
limitations of language, the ambiguity of knowledge structures, and
some implications of information processing. For example, cognitive
theories of information processing fail to deal with the finding
that organisms do not work to produce information per se; they only
work to produce information correlated with reinforcing events.
Cognitive models of science have little to say about those major
scientific innovations, obvious in retrospect, that were slow to be
accepted because their content was not what people wanted to hear.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(43) | WHY DON'T WE YET HAVE A COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE?
Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition Gary L. Hardcastle Department of Philosophy Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0126 garyhard@vtvm1.cc.vt.edu |
Abstract:
The cognitive science of science is not yet here. This
can be seen from the volume under review (Giere, 1992) by attending
to the diversity and mutual incompatibility of its contents. I
consider several of the papers in turn and then discuss reasons why
there is not yet a cognitive science of science.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(44) | A REPRESENTATIONAL VIEW OF SCIENCE
Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition Herbert L. Roitblat Department of Psychology University of Hawaii 2430 Campus Road Honolulu, HI 96822 roitblat@hawaii.edu |
Abstract:
Cognitive science can provide the tools for examining and
understanding conceptual development in scientists. Science
develops nonalgorithmically and nonlinearly. Scientists in
different paradigms use different ontological representations.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(45) | WHY WE SHOULD NOT RELY ON COGNITIVE SCIENCE
TO UNIFY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition Carol W. Slater Department of Psychology Alma College Alma, MI 48801 CSLATER@ALMA.EDU |
Abstract:
Contrary to Ronald Giere's hope, enlisting the cognitive
sciences to play a role filled by logic and history will not bring
about programmatic unity in the philosophy of science (Giere, 1992,
1993). I consider two such possible roles and conclude by
questioning the assumption that programmatic unity is in and of
itself a desirable goal.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(62) | COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE:
WHAT'S THE CONNECTION? Reply to Bookstein, Catania, Hardcastle, Roitblat, Shafto, Slater & van Brakel on Scientific-Cognition Ronald N. Giere Department of Philosophy and Center for Philosophy of Science University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN 55455 philosci@maroon.tc.umn.edu |
Abstract:
This reply to reviewers of Cognitive Models of Science
(Giere, 1992) focuses on issues raised concerning the overall
project. I conclude that the cognitive sciences provide useful
resources for a naturalistic philosophy of science. The noted
disunity in the cognitive sciences places limitations on how
unified a naturalistic philosophy of science could be, but does not
detract from the overall project.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(69) | SEARCHING FOR COGNITION IN COGNITIVE MODELS OF SCIENCE
Book Review of Giere on Scientific-Cognition David Klahr Department of Psychology Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 klahr@cmu.edu |
Abstract:
The goal of Cognitive Models of Science (1992) is to
demonstrate the ways in which the field of Cognitive Science is
becoming a resource for Philosophy of Science. However, it fails to
provide a framework for understanding much of the potentially
relevant work in Cognitive Science. In this review, I suggest one
such framework, and provide a "reader's guide" to the work in
cognitive psychology that directly addresses questions about the
psychology of science.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(70) | COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE: THE WAVE
OF THE FUTURE OR A BLAST FROM THE PAST? Reply to Bookstein, Catania, Hardcastle, Roitblat, Shafto, Slater & van Brakel on Scientific-Cognition Steve Fuller Department of Sociology and Social Policy University of Durham Durham DH1 3JT United Kingdom steve.fuller@durham.ac.uk |
Abstract:
As someone who was identified (correctly) as skeptical
of the project outlined in Giere (1992), I argue that a Cognitive
Science of Science was desirable a half-century ago, when the
logical positivists first proposed something like it, but is now an
anachronism -- a point implicitly realized by some of the
contributors and reviewers. I stress the need to examine the socio-
historical circumstances that make grand synthetic projects like
Giere's appear attractive.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |
| 5(71) | COGNITION FOR SCIENCE?
Book Review of Giere on Scientific Cognition Winand H. Dittrich University of Hertfordshire & Psychology Division Hatfield, AL10 9AB, UK W.H.Dittrich@herts.ac.uk W.H.Dittrich@ex.ac.uk |
Abstract:
In this review of Giere's Cognitive Models of Science
(1992), underlying theoretical assumptions of cognitive models are
examined from a psychological and philosophical viewpoint. In
particular, the aim of the book to constitute a unified cognitive
model for the sciences is addressed. The ambiguity of cognitive
processes is discussed as a major problem for cognitive
explanations of science theory from a Kantian point of view.
Keywords: Cognitive science, philosophy of science, cognitive models, artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitve neuroscience. |