Summary of PSYCOLOQUY topic Frame Problem

Topic:
Title & AuthorAbstract
3(59) REASONING AGENTS IN A DYNAMIC WORLD: THE FRAME PROBLEM
[JAI Press 1991, Greenwich CT, 289 pages, ISBN 1-55938-082-9]
Precis of Hayes and Ford (eds) on Frame-Problem
Patrick J. Hayes
Beckman Institute
405 North Mathews Avenue
Urbana IL 61801

Kenneth M. Ford

hayes@cs.stanford.edu
Abstract: What happens when one picks up a brick? Any child knows that the brick is now held in the air, there is one fewer object on the ground, and THAT'S ALL. For over twenty years it has been astonishingly hard to make a computer draw this conclusion. This "frame problem" is symptomatic of a host of problems in how to properly represent common knowledge about everyday actions. The papers in this volume discuss some of these problems, develop approaches to solving them, or draw philosophical conclusions from them.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

3(60) THE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF THE FRAME PROBLEM
Review of Ford & Hayes on the Frame-Problem
J. van Brakel
Department of Philosophy
University of Utrecht
P.O. Box 80.126
3508 TC Utrecht (Netherlands)
telephone -31.3402.43912
telefax -31.30.532816

brakel@phil.ruu.nl
Abstract: This is primarily a critical discussion of Ford & Hayes (1991; for PSYCOLOQUY Summary, see Hayes 1992), taking into account other recent literature on the frame problem. [References to chapters and pages in the Ford & Hayes volume are given in square brackets.]

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

3(62) FRAMING IS A DYNAMIC PROCESS
Commentary on Ford & Hayes on Frame Problem
Walter J. Freeman
MCB LSA 129
Division of Neurobiology
University of California
Berkeley CA 94720

wfreeman@garnet.berkeley.edu
Abstract: It appears that Hayes's premises are that the primitive reasoning of a child suffices for framing and that the superior reasoning of a highly educated adult should do better. This does not nesessarily follow, however, since, paraphrasing from Neumann (1958), brains do logic poorly, and logical devices do framing poorly. Framing is the natural outcome of the dynamic process by which meaning is created in the forebrain under the influence of sensory flow, past experience embedded in synaptic change, and the immediacy of impending action and expected reward.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(14) VAN BRAKEL'S POSITION APPEARS TO BE INCOHERENT
Commentary on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame-Problem
James H. Fetzer
Department of Philosophy
University of Minnesota
Duluth, MN 55812

jfetzer@ub.d.umn.edu
Abstract: Van Brakel's position appears to be incoherent. His argument is logically inconsistent; second, in denying my position, he denies his own; and, third, what he maintains is impossible is actually possible. Van Brakel's stance is thus invalid on logical, semantical and empirical grounds.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(21) EFFECTIVE DESCRIPTIONS NEED NOT BE COMPLETE
Reply to Van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem
Pat Hayes
Beckman Institute
University of Illinois
Urbana IL 61801

Ken Ford
Institute for Human & Machine Cognition
University of West Florida
Pensacola FL 32514

phayes@herodotus.cs.uiuc.edu kford@trivia.coginst.uwf.edu
Abstract: One can approach van Brakel's (1992) review of Ford & Hayes (1991) in two different ways: as a scholarly critique of the frame problem (FP) in general, or as an argument that traditional AI is inadequate to handle a new fundamental problem that he dubs the "problem of complete description" (PCD). We respond on both of these levels.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(22) PROBLEMS WITH FRAMES
Reply to Freeman on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem
Pat Hayes
Beckman Institute
University of Illinois
Urbana IL 61801

Ken Ford
Institute for Human & Machine Cognition
University of West Florida
Pensacola, FL 32514

phayes@herodotus.cs.uiuc.edu kford@trivia.coginst.uwf.edu
Abstract: It is clear that Freeman (1992) has not read the book itself, but is only responding to the summary of it that appeared in PSYCOLOQUY (Hayes 1992) he therefore appears to miss the point in several respects.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(23) UNJUSTIFIED COHERENCE.
Commentary on Fetzer on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem
J. van Brakel
Department of Philosophy
University of Utrecht
P.O. Box 80.126
3508 TC Utrecht (Netherlands)

brakel@phil.ruu.nl
Abstract: Fetzer's position exemplifies a case of unjustified coherence. He straight-jackets all words and concepts in decontextualised idiosyncratic definitions. This is of little relevance for real-world problems such as the frame problem.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(24) VAN BRAKEL'S POSITION IS PERFECTLY COHERENT
Commentary on Fetzer on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem
Rick Grush
Department of Philosophy
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92037

rgrush@sdcc3.ucsd.edu
Abstract: Fetzer's reasons for disputing van Brakel's (1992) position are based on misunderstanding of van Brakel's arguments.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(25) THE CHANGING SCENE
Book Review of Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem
Robert A. Morris
Computer Science Department
Florida Institute of Technology
Melbourne, FL 32901

morris@cs.fit.edu
Abstract: This volume is a useful guides to recent advances in AI and cognitive science towards a satisfactory solution to the frame problem. Being an original collection, many of the contributions further the advance of research in this area. In addition, many of the articles point the way for the reader interested in exploring broader foundational issues.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(33) PHILOSOPHY UNFRAMED
Reply to Van Brakel, Grush, and Morris on Frame Problem
James H. Fetzer
Department of Philosophy
University of Minnesota
Duluth, MN 55812

jfetzer@ub.d.umn.edu
Abstract: Van Brakel (1993), Grush (1993), and Morris (1993) dispute the analysis of the frame problem which is advanced in Fetzer (1991a) and (1991b). I suggest that the frame problem can best be understood as a special case of the problem of induction. Those who persist in maintaining that the frame problem is exclusively a problem of representation miss the point that without a solution to the problem of change even the availability of a representation scheme serves no suitable purpose because there is no solution to the problem of change to represent. And those who persist in maintaining that the frame problem is one of "common sense" rather than one of scientific knowledge need to understand that changes in the world come about as a causal consequence of the operation of natural laws, the objects of scientific discovery. The resources "common sense" provides are not adequate to the problem.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(34) PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS: THE FRAME PROBLEM AS A SYMPTOM OF THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM
Commentary on Van Brakel & Fetzer on Ford & Hayes on the Frame-Problem
Stevan Harnad
Laboratoire Cognition et Mouvement
URA CNRS 1166 I.B.H.O.P.
Universite d'Aix Marseille II
13388 Marseille cedex 13, France
33-91-66-00-69

harnad@riluminy.univ-mrs.fr
Abstract: There arrear to be both ecumenical and hegemonic sentiments in the air. One solution is "scaling up", that more and more ungrounded sentences, pushing the frame's limits wider and wider, will eventually shrink the remaining "frame problems" to only those that we, the interpreters, are also prone to. So we will either not notice them or cease to regard them as evidence that there is something wrong with this kind of model in the first place, however, I think the reason the frame problem keeps rearing its head is because there is something intrinsically wrong with an ungrounded symbolic approach to modeling the mind. Knowledge cannot be "framed" with symbols alone. I believe a better candidate solution happens to be to try to ground a system's internal symbols in its robotic capacity to discriminate, manipulate, categorize, name, describe, and discourse coherently about the objects, events and states of affairs that its symbols are systematically interpretable as being about indistinguishabley from the way we (humans) do it. In short, symbolic capacities are to be grounded in robotic capacities.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.

4(42) MODELING OUR ADAPTIVE INTELLIGENCE, NOT GOD'S
Reply to Fetzer on Ford & Hayes on Frame Problem
Patrick J. Hayes
Beckman Institute
University of Illinois
Urbana, Il 61801

Kenneth M. Ford
Institute for Human & Machine Cognition
University of West Florida
Pensacola, FL 32514

phayes@herodotus.cs.uiuc.edu kford@trivia.coginst.uwf.edu
Abstract: Fetzer misunderstands our use of the term "frame problem", taking the term to refer to, contrary to the original definition (McCarthy, 1963), a larger problem of change, which is an instance of the classical problem of induction.

Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem.