Summary of PSYCOLOQUY topic Hyperstructure

Topic:
Title & AuthorAbstract
10(031) HYPERSTRUCTURE IN BRAIN AND COGNITION
Target Article on Hyperstructure
Ken Richardson
Centre for Human Development & Learning
The Open University
Walton Hall
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA
United Kingdom

k.richardson@open.ac.uk
Abstract: This target article tries to identify the informational content of experience underlying object percepts and concepts in complex, changeable environments, in a way which can be related to higher cerebral functions. In complex environments, repetitive experience of feature- and object-images in static, canonical form is rare, and this remains a problem in current theories of conceptual representation. The only reliable information available in natural experience consists of nested covariations or 'hyperstructures'. These need to be registered in a representational system. Such representational hyperstructures can have novel emergent structures and evolution into 'higher' forms of representation, such as object concepts and event- and social-schemas. Together, these can provide high levels of predictability. A sketch of a model of hyperstructural functions in object perception and conception is presented. Some comparisons with related views in the literature of the recent decades are made, and some empirical evidence is briefly reviewed.

Keywords: complexity, covariation, features, hypernetwork, hyperstructure, object concepts, receptive field, representation

10(034) EXTRACTING PREDICTABLE HYPERSTRUCTURE
Commentary on Richardson on Hyperstructure
Juergen Schmidhuber
IDSIA
Corso Elvezia 36
6900 Lugano
Switzerland
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen

juergen@idsia.ch
Abstract: Richardson's project is partially realized in previous work on discovery of predictable classifications.

Keywords: complexity, covariation, features, hypernetwork, hyperstructure, object concepts, receptive field, representation

10(040) ABSTRACT IDEAS, SCHEMATA AND HYPERSTRUCTURES: PLUS CA CHANGE...
Commentary on Richardson on Hyperstructure
Cyril Latimer
Department of Psychology
University of Sydney
NSW 2006 Australia
http://www.psych.usyd.edu.ay/staff/cyril

cyril@psych.usyd.edu.au
Abstract: Richardson's hyperstructures display the characteristics of a number of earlier explanatory concepts in perception and pattern recognition. Questions can be raised about their exact ontological status: Are they truly global constructs? or are they derived from the products of prior local processing? If the former, then what is the mechanism of their direct detection? If the latter, then questions can be asked about the validity of Richardson's attack on so-called "feature theory," which would seem to provide the basis for the extraction and derivation of hyperstructures. A more explicit conception of hyperstructures may be in terms of the "dependence systems" suggested by Rescher & Oppenheim (1955). Richardson suggests that hyperstructures fill a "void" in connectionist systems. It is argued here that there is no such void, and that Richardson's claim stems from his confusion of neural-level and cognitive descriptions, together with an incomplete exposition of the exact ontological status of his hyperstructures.

Keywords: connectionism, feature, global, hyperstructure, local, schema, part, whole.

10(065) HOW HYPERSTRUCTURES WORK
Response to Latimer and Schmidhuber on Richardson on Hyperstructures
Ken Richardson
Centre for Human Development & Learning
The Open University
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA
U.K.

k.richardson@open.ac.uk
Abstract: I reply to Latimer's (1999) criticisms by trying to clarify some key features of the Hyperstructures model, discussing further some evidence in its favour, and explaining its ontological status. I acknowledge the specific instantiation of a hyperstructure in the neural net described by Schmidhuber (1999).

Keywords: hyperstructure, feature, global, local, connectionism, neural nets