Bruce Bridgeman (1992) Language and Plans in the Analysis of Consciousness. Psycoloquy: 3(26) Consciousness (11)

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Psycoloquy 3(26): Language and Plans in the Analysis of Consciousness

LANGUAGE AND PLANS IN THE ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Reply to Murre on Bridgeman on Consciousness

Bruce Bridgeman
Dept. of Psychology
Kerr Hall UCSC
Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064
(408) 459-4005

bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu

Abstract

In my target article I suggest that sequential articulation of action and articulation of language arise from the same mechanism. Murre's assertion of a "mediated action" linking sophisticated language and planning creates more problems than it solves.

Keywords

consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system

1.1 In his para. 1.2, Murre (1992) assumes that the target article engaged two parallel forms of behavior, planning and language, and that they interact because we can communicate plans to others. In fact, the target article asserts that the two behaviors, sequential articulation of action and articulation of language, arise from the SAME mechanism. The action-planning machinery in the brain was appropriated by communicative needs to support a serial channel of symbolic communication. The first step was the ability not to communicate plans, but to plan communications. As others have commented as well, the communicative power of language adds greatly to the ability to plan effective actions, but the two functions share the same flexible mechanism. Evolution does not offer us enough time to evolve a separate linguistic machinery from scratch.

1.2 The idea of a "reservoir of plans and mental tools" (para. 3.5) is a useful one, making concrete the idea of a social amplifier effect of the power of planning when enhanced by linguistic/cultural communication. Murre argues that "simple speech" and "practical intelligence" may have co-evolved directly, but that more sophisticated language and planning share no common structure, being linked instead in "mediated action." This analysis requires constructing a dividing line somewhere in the continuum of language acquisition and use, and a similar dividing line in the ontology of planning. On the other side of these lines, the rules change qualitatively. I suggest that this analysis creates more problems than it solves. Is there any empirical support for the idea? Mediated action, in my view, can remain cohesive into adulthood precisely because both action planning and language share a common mechanism. There is no need to change the rules in midstream, because the planning mechanism always handles mediated action. We simply become more skilled at this with age and experience.

REFERENCES

Murre, Jacob M.J. (1992) From Plans to Mediated Actions. Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness PSYCOLOQUY 3(25) consciousness.10