Bruce Bridgeman (1992) Language and Planning: one Mechanism or Two?. Psycoloquy: 3(28) Consciousness (13)

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Psycoloquy 3(28): Language and Planning: one Mechanism or Two?

LANGUAGE AND PLANNING: ONE MECHANISM OR TWO?
Reply to Noble on Bridgeman on Consciousness

Bruce Bridgeman
Dept. of Psychology
Kerr Hall UCSC
Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064
(408) 459-4005

bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu

Abstract

Noble suggests it would be more effective for plan-monitoring and plan-executing mechanisms to connect with each other directly, in the brain. I in fact hypothesized this connectionin my article. Noble's statements about language are accurate, but he has the phylogenetic developmental sequence the wrong way around. My hypothesis that language and planning share some of the same mechanisms requires that the two appear together both in phylogenesis and in ontogenesis, and this seems to be what occurs.

Keywords

consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system

1.1 In his para. 1.4, Noble (1992) asks whether it wouldn't be more effective for plan-monitoring and plan-executing mechanisms to connect with each other directly, in the brain. They do! In para. 3.7 of the target article (Bridgeman 1992), this connection is hypothesized directly, with experimental support from Vygotskii and Luria. This connection allows two kinds of recursion: one within an individual's brain, and another with other brains. Ideas and plans may cycle through so many brains that the individual identity of their origins is lost, and the idea or plan becomes a social construct. This is completely consistent with the target article.

1.2 All of Noble's statements in his para. 1.6 about language are accurate, but it does not follow that language makes planning possible -- Noble has the phylogenetic developmental sequence the wrong way around. Planning of sequences of actions exists in all the primates, and there is plenty of empirical evidence (some of it cited in the target article) for this. Yet the use of sequences of signs for symbolic communication appears only in humans. One can certainly say that language makes planning more effective by centrally involving others in the plan-constructing process, so that each capability enhances the other. My hypothesis that language and planning share some of the same mechanisms requires that the two appear together both in phylogenesis and in ontogenesis, and this seems to be what happens.

REFERENCES

Bridgeman, B. (1992). On the Evolution of Consciousness and Language. PSYCOLOQUY 3(15) consciousness.1

Noble, William (1992) Plans and the Evolution of Behavior. Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness PSYCOLOQUY 3(27) consciousness.12