Gerald M. Phillips (Professor Emeritus) (1992) Implicit Philosophy. Psycoloquy: 3(30) Space (2)

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PSYCOLOQUY (ISSN 1055-0143) is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA).
Psycoloquy 3(30): Implicit Philosophy

IMPLICIT PHILOSOPHY
Commentary on Bryant on Space

Gerald M. Phillips (Professor Emeritus)
Speech Communication
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802

GMP@PSUVM.bitnet

Abstract

I welcome the scientific argument offered by Bryant. It should not, however, be forgotten that the notion of spatiality has a long intellectual history stretching back to Aristotle. By bearing other works in mind a good deal could be done bridge the gap between the sciences and the humanities and would deepen his argument by a genuflection to past wisdom.

Keywords

Spacial representation, spacial models, cognitive maps, linguistic structure.
1.1 I merely wish to point out that the notion of spatiality has a long intellectual history. I would draw Bryant's (1992) attention to two works, specifically. In the first, Hampden-Turner (1981) writes the following as the organizing rubric: "We 'map' with words as well as images but because words come in bits and pieces many people have assumed that the world is in bits and pieces too, with bits corresponding to words... Word maps have a fragmentary structure that derives from language itself, not necessarily from what language describes." The book proceeds to detail the mapping function of mind by taking 60 key philosophies and recasting them as visual "maps."

1.2 More to the point, in the Cooper (1932) translation of Aristotle's RHETORIC (2.22, Pg. 155 ff.), Aristotle is quoted as saying, "Let us first discuss in general terms the method by which a speaker should look for them [topics], and then take up the question of their topics. [A topic is a head, under which are grouped arguments, or lines of argument; in a TOPOS (locus, place, region) a speaker has a stock of arguments to which he may turn for a particular need.]

1.3 Aristotle goes on to discuss, in detail, the spatial arrangement of knowledge, arguing for the existence of universal and special topics located for all humans in similar places (a foreshadowing of Chomsky's [1987] concept of deep structures). It appears that Bryant's target article is actually a substantiation of Aristotle's speculations. This is of considerable consequence, because the whole of rhetoric depends on this spacial conceptualization, especially as it relates to the canon of inventio or the discovery of sayable knowledge.

1.4 I welcome the scientific argument offered by Bryant and respectfully call his attention to these two more literary expositions. By referring to them in context, he a could do a good deal to bridge the gap between the sciences and the humanities and would deepen his own argument by a respectful genuflection to past "wisdom." There is a great deal of literature on the matter of the topoi, spanning some two millennia of contemplation of the problem of how people represent their metaphysics to themselves and arrange it in presentational form for others. If Bryant is interested, I can point him to some major sources and a whole body of literature not represented in his list of references.

REFERENCES

Bryant, D.J. (1992) A Spatial Representation System in Humans. PSYCOLOQUY 3 (16) space.1

Chomsky, N. (1987) The Chomsky Reader. (Ed. James Peck). New York: Pantheon Books

Cooper, L. (1932) (trans.) Aristotle's Rhetoric. Appleton-Century-Crofts

Hampden-Turner, C. (1981) Maps of the Mind. Macmillan


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