I defined a plan as an internally held image of an intended achievement. The plan can then control a sequence of actions to achieve a goal. This property of plans is not inconsistent with the definition. I also pointed out that plans motivate behavior. Again, there is no inconsistency, just an elaboration. McGovern and Baars ask whether we decide unconsciously which of several plans might be used to achieve a goal. The answer is, yes: plans pop into our heads like the "aha" phenomenon of Gestalt psychology. There is an iterative process, however, that can use internal speech to develop plans. If consciousness is a result of the planning mechanisms at work, then the functions of consciousness are the functions of plans and planning. In my interpretation, the perception of sequences is handled not by the plan-executing (motor) mechanism, but by a separate plan-monitoring (sensory) mechanism that functions both to monitor one's own progress in a plan and to interpret sequences of outside events. Simpler perceptions become conscious to the degree that they engage the working memory needed to consolidate sensory events into interpreted experiences.
1.2 In their section 1.5, M&B ask whether we decide unconsciously which of several plans might be used to achieve a goal. The answer is, yes: plans pop into our heads like the "aha" phenomenon of Gestalt psychology. There is an iterative process, however, that can use internal speech to develop plans. As discussed in the target article, internal speech can make the parts of the brain that are normally used in communication available to internal information processing. If a plan "to do x" or "to say y" arises in this way, the processing becomes conscious and is stored in memory. But the eventual action plan is still decided at an unconscious level. Like the exact moment of going to sleep, the moment of decision always seems to elude us. In the human being, iterative processes alternating in parallel- serial-parallel fashion can amplify not only communication, but also the planning process itself. Dennett (1991) maintains that the brain is a parallel machine which simulates a serial one, in just this sense. These speculative ideas cry out for empirical confirmation.
1.3 Contrastive analysis of consciousness, as used so effectively by Baars (1988), might in my view be equally well interpreted as a contrastive analysis of the role of plans in controlling behavior and experience. If consciousness is a result of the planning mechanisms at work, then the functions of consciousness are the functions of plans and planning.
1.4 Motor theories of perception, which appeared before the turn of the century and have popped up occasionally ever since, have been thoroughly discredited. In my interpretation, the perception of sequences is handled not by the plan-executing (motor) mechanism, but by a separate plan-monitoring (sensory) mechanism that functions both to monitor one's own progress in a plan and to interpret sequences of outside events. Simpler perceptions become conscious to the degree that they engage the working memory needed to consolidate sensory events into interpreted experiences.
Bridgeman, B. (1992) On the Evolution of Consciousness and Language. Psycoloquy 3(15) consciousness.1
Baars, B. (1988) A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
McGovern, K. & Baars, B. (1992) Consciousness Confounded. PSYCOLOQUY 3(47) consciousness.25
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E. H. & Pribram, K. H. (1960) Plans and the Structure of Behavior. New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston.
Pribram, K. H. (1971) Languages of the Brain. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.