Richard DeWitt (1993) Representation and the Foundations of Cognitive Science
. Psycoloquy: 4(11) Fodor Representation (3)
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Psycoloquy 4(11): Representation and the Foundations of Cognitive Science
REPRESENTATION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Commentary on Wallis on Fodor-Representation
Richard DeWitt
Department of Philosophy
Fairfield University
Fairfield, CT 06430
rdewitt@fair1.fairfield.edu
Abstract
The focus of Wallis (1992) is a critique of Fodor's
theory of mental representation. I discuss some foundational issues
that Wallis has passed over too quickly. In particular (a) the
importance of representation for Fodor's project and (b) some
issues surrounding the role of representation in cognitive science
in general. My point is that the lack of an acceptable account of
mental representation is not just an idle puzzle but rather has
important implications for foundational issues in cognitive
science.
Keywords
cognitive science, Fodor, intentionality, mind/body
problem, representation
References
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