WHEN IS THE USE OF BASE-RATE INFORMATION NOT A LOGICAL IMPERATIVE?
Commentary on Koehler on Base-rates

Abstract

The view that people fail to use base-rate information appropriately in making various judgments and decisions may have a weaker empirical and logical foundation than many judgment and decision scientists have assumed. Koehler (1993) describes several problems with the base-rate neglect thesis. We agree with Koehler and we offer two examples, one from the attribution literature and one from a legal decision context, to argue that there is no logical imperative mandating the way base-rate information should be used for these types of judgments and decisions.

Keywords

References

• Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychologica, 44, 211-233.
• Bar-Hillel, M. (1983). The base-rate fallacy controversy. In: Decision making under uncertainty (pp. 39-61), ed. R. W. Scholz. Elsevier Science.
• Borgida, E. & Brekke, N. (1981). The base-rate fallacy in attribution and prediction. In J. H. Harvey, W. Ickes & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution research (Vol. 3, pp. 63-95). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
• Christensen-Szalanski, J.J.J. & Bushyhead, J.B. (1981). Physicians' use of probabilistic information in a real clinical setting. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 7, 928-935.
• Dane, F.C. (1985). In search of reasonable doubt. Law and Human Behavior, 9, 141-158.
• Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Company, 406 F. 2d. 1315-1318 (3rd Cir. 1969).
• Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (Eds.) (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Koehler, J.J. (1993). The Base Rate Fallacy Myth. PSYCOLOQUY 4(49) base-rate.1.koehler.
• McCormick, C. (1984). Handbook of the law of evidence (3rd ed.). St. Paul, MN: West.
• Nesson, C. (1985) The evidence or the event? On judicial proof and the acceptability of verdicts. Harvard Law Review 98:1357-1392.
• Nisbett, R.E. & Borgida, E. (1975). Attribution and the psychology of prediction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 932-943.
• Nisbett, R.E., Borgida, E., Crandall, R. & Reed, H. (1976). Popular induction: Information is not necessarily informative. In J.S. Carroll & J.W. Payne (Eds.), Cognition and social behavior. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Inc.
• Pollard, P. & Evans, J. St. B.T. (1983). The role of 'representativeness' in statistical inference: A critical appraisal. In thinking and reasoning: Psychological approaches (pp. 107-134), ed. J. St. B.T. Evans. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Probability and inference in the law of evidence [Symposium] (1986). Boston University Law Review 66.
• Simon, R. J. (1969). Judges' translation of burdens of proof into statements of probability. Trial Lawyers' Guide, 38, 103-114.
• Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E. 2d. 754 (1945).
• Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1980). Causal schemas in judgments under uncertainty. Progress in social psychology (pp. 49-72), ed. M. Fishbein. Erlbaum.
• Wells, G.L. (1992). Naked statistical evidence of liability: Is subjective probability enough? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 739-752.
• Wells, G.L. & Harvey, J.H. (1977). Do people use consensus information in making causal attributions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 279-293.
• Wells, G.L. & Harvey, J.H. (1978). Naive attributors' attributions and predictions: What is informative and when is an effect an effect? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 483-490.