WHAT ROBOTS CAN AND CAN'T BE
[Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, 10 chapters, 380 pages]
Precis of Bringsjord on Robot-Consciousness

<hr> Selmer Bringsjord (1994) What Robots can and Can't be . Psycoloquy: 5(59) Robot Consciousness (1)<br>Versions: <a href=ftp://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/pub/psycoloquy//1994.volume.5/psyc.94.5.59.robot-consciousness.1.bringsjord>ASCII</a> <a href=https://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?5.59>formatted</a><hr>
<TITLE>Psycoloquy 5(59): What Robots can and Can't be </TITLE>
<H1>WHAT ROBOTS CAN AND CAN'T BE                     <br>
[Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, 10 chapters, 380 pages]<br>
Precis of Bringsjord on Robot-Consciousness<br>
</H1>
<ADDRESS>Selmer Bringsjord<br>
Dept. of Philosophy, Psychology & Cognitive Science <br>
Department of Computer Science<br>
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute<br>
Troy, NY 12180<br>
<br>
<a href=mailto:selmer@rpi.edu>selmer@rpi.edu</a> 
</ADDRESS>
<P><H1>Abstract</H1><BLOCKQUOTE>
This book argues that (1) AI will continue to produce
machines with the capacity to pass stronger and stronger versions
of the Turing Test but that (2) the "Person Building Project" (the
attempt by AI and Cognitive Science to build a machine which is a
person) will inevitably fail. The defense of (2) rests in large
part on a refutation of the proposition that persons are automata
-- a refutation involving an array of issues, from free will to
Godel to introspection to Searle and beyond. The defense of (1)
brings the reader face to face with Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson
as they tackle perhaps their toughest case (Silver Blaze); the
upshot of this visit with Conan Doyle's duo is an algorithm-sketch
for solving murder mysteries. The author's mechanical approach to
writing fiction and the philosophical side of computerized story
generation are also discussed.
</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P><H1>Keywords</H1><i>
behaviorism, Chinese Room Argument, cognition,
consciousness, finite automata, free will, functionalism,
introspection, mind, story generation, Turing machines, Turing
Test.
</i>
<H1>References</H1><UL>
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</UL>