Christopher D. Green (1998) Semantics is not the Issue
. Psycoloquy: 9(28) Connectionist Explanation (25)
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Psycoloquy 9(28): Semantics is not the Issue
SEMANTICS IS NOT THE ISSUE
Christopher D. Green
Reply to French & Cleeremans on Connectionist-Explanation
Department of Psychology
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
French & Cleeremans claim that my argument (Green 1998)
requires that every part of a connectionist network be semantically
interpretable. They have confused semantic interpretation (an issue
peculiar to cognitive science) with a simple correspondence between
aspects of models and aspects of the portion of the world being
modeled (an issue as relevant to physics as to cognitive science),
and have thereby misunderstood my position. Most of the rest of
their commentary follows from their initial misapprehension.
artificial intelligence, cognition, computer modelling,
connectionism, epistemology, explanation, methodology, neural nets,
philosophy of science, theory.
- Churchland, P. M. (1990) Cognitive activity in artificial neural networks. In: Thinking: An invitation to cognitive science (Vol. 3), ed. D. N. Osherson & E. E. Smith, MIT Press.
- Crick, F.H.C. & Asanuma, C. (1986) Certain aspects of the anatomy and physiology of the cerebral cortex. In: Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (vol. 2), ed. McClelland, J. L. & Rumelhart, D. E., MIT Press.
- Fodor, J. A. & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition 28:3-71.
- French, R. M. & Cleermans, A. (1998) Function, sufficiently constrained, implies form: Commentary on Green on connectionist- explanation. PSYCOLOQUY 9 (21) ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/ psyc.98.9.21.connectionist-explanation.18.french
- Green, C.D. (1998) Are Connectionist Models Theories of Cognition? PSYCOLOQUY 9 (4) ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/ psyc.98.9.04.connectionist-explanation.1.green