NEITHER SEMANTICS NOR THEORY-OBSERVATION ARE RELEVANT
Reply to Raftopoulos on Connectionist-Explanation

Abstract

Raftopoulos (1998) claims that I (Green 1998) argued that every node in a connectionist network must be semantically interpretable, and that I rely crucially on an untenable distinction between theory and observation to make my argument run. I reply by showing that neither of these claims is correct, and that Raftopoulos's case against my argument does not appear to be coherent.

Keywords

References

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