| Title & Author | Abstract | |
|---|---|---|
| 12(027) | PRINCIPLES OF COGNITION, LANGUAGE AND ACTION: ESSAYS ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF A SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY [Dordrecht/Boston/New York: Kluwer Academic Press, 2000, xxi + 492pp ISBN 0-7923-6230-6/6231-4] Precis of Praetorius on Cognition-Action Nini Praetorius Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. nini@psy.ku.dk |
Abstract:
The book exposes serious flaws in the reductionist
assumptions of Mind and Matter of Naturalism and Constructivism,
which underlie research and theorizing on cognition, language and
action within current academic psychology. The author argued for
alternative tenable assumptions about the relation between mental
and material reality which, as a matter of principle, must be taken
for granted, and be the point of departure for all further
investigations into both reality and our descriptions of it. It is
the intention to show that the assumptions and principles derived
from the arguments in the book offer a consistent foundation for a
science of psychology. Furthermore, it seems that they open up new
and straightforward ways of dealing with key-issues of truth and
intentionality, subjectivity and objectivity, of relevance to
psychology, philosophy and the humanities.
Keywords: Mind-Matter Dualism; Mind-Body Dualism; Mind-Reality Dualism; Psychophysical Reduction; Knowledge; Cognition; Language; Truth; Inter-subjectivity; Identity; Epistemology; Ontology. |
| 13(006) | WHY PHYSICALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE MIND
Book Review of Nini Praetorius on Cognition-Action Riccardo Manzotti LIRA-Lab, DIST (Department of Bioengineering, Robotics, and Computer Science) Viale Francesco Causa 13 16145 Genova manzotti@lira.dist.unige.it |
Abstract:
The struggle between materialism and idealism is still
alive, disguised as naturalism vs. constructivism. Against it,
Praetorius (2000) proposes the principle of the general correctness
of cognition and language: we have knowledge of reality and a
language that may be used to say something about reality. If this
claim was true, why should we not dare to go further and see what
it entails?
Keywords: Mind-Matter Dualism; Mind-Body Dualism; Mind-Reality Dualism; Psychophysical Reduction; Knowledge; Cognition; Language; Truth; Inter-subjectivity; Identity; Epistemology; Ontology. |
| 13(007) | COGNITION, EPISTEMOLOGY, ONTOLOGY
Book review of Praetorius on Cognition-Action Benny Shanon Department of Psychology The Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel msshanon@mscc.huji.ac.il |
Abstract:
In her book (Praetorious, 2000), Praetorious argues
against the exclusion of epistemology and ontology by contemporary
cognitive psychology. I am fully sympathetic to her view. In this
commentary I place the cognitive approach in perspective and
present further support for the conclusion advocated by Praetorius.
Keywords: anti-Cartesianism, anti-representationalism, cognition, consciousness, epistemology, ontology, panpsychism, philosophy of psychology |
| 13(017) | EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES IN COGNITIVE THEORY
Reply to Manzotti and Shanon on Praetorius on Cognition-Action Nini Praetorius Department of Psychology University of Copenhagen Njalsgade 88 DK - 2300 Copenhagen S Denmark nini.praetorius@psy.ku.dk |
Abstract:
In their reviews both Manzotti and Shanon stress the
importance for Cognitive Science of addressing the
epistemological and ontological issues implicit in cognitive
processes. In my reply to their views and suggestions I attempt to
clarify the position presented in my book concerning these issues.
Keywords: Cognition, Language, Mind-Matter problems, Mind- Reality problems, ontology, epistemology, intentionality, truth. |
| 13(019) | AN UNRAVELLING OF PRINCIPLES WE ALL HAVE TO USE
Book Review of Praetorius on Cognition-Action Maarja Siiner and Jesper Hermann Psychology of Language Section Department of General and Applied Linguistics University of Copenhagen Denmark maarja@siiner.com; jh@cphling.dk |
Abstract:
There is an urgent need in psychology for an epistemology
which can deal consistently with the properties of persons that
uniquely characterize human beings, i.e. our cognition and use of
language, and which determine our action and possibilities of
action, i.e. the conditions for being and functioning as persons.
An epistemology which - in contrast to the naturalist epistemology
- does not want to get rid of human cognition in order to become
scientific. The final outcome of Nini Praetorius' book about the
principles of cognition, language and action is a new,
scientifically underpinned way of using the proper logic of
language itself as an opening for investigating the psychological
events of real persons in real time. In this way, the book
furnishes us with a new, comprehensive starting point for any study
in psychology, in the psychology of language, and in
psycholinguistics.
Keywords: Psychology of Language; Mind and Matter; Language Use; Relations between Language, Knowledge, Concepts and Reality; Inter-Subjectivity of Knowledge and Language; Identity and Identification; Psycholinguistics. |
| 13(020) | A PRINCIPLED BASIS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Book Review of Praetorius on Cognition-Action Daniel D. Hutto Reader in Philosophy of Psychology Department of Humanities University of Hertfordshire Watford Campus, Aldenham, Hertfordshire WD2 8AT England phlqddh@herts.ac.uk |
Abstract:
Praetorius' book advocates a healthy review and reform
of the basic assumptions of much general theorising in psychology.
Her central concern is to supply reasons of principle to demarcate
the psychological and stave off reductionism. She seeks to derive
these results from a handful of principles that she holds must be
accepted since they form the very grounds for engaging in any
inquiry at all. She employs these to good effect by showing that a
number of prominent targets engaged in psychological theorising,
including Gibson, Marr, Saussure, Stich and Fodor, are prey to
deep-seated confusions about the general relation between language
and the world. Similarly, she argues that social constructivists
and relativists fall foul of the same oversight. I applaud her
arguments against these figures and schools of thought.
Keywords: Cognitive Science, Fictional Entities, History of Science, Naturalism, Psychology, Reductionism, Reality, Scientific Theorising, Truth, Wittgenstein |
| 13(022) | PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF COGNITION, LANGUAGE AND ACTION.
Reply to Siiner and Hermann on Praetorius on Cognition-Action Nini Praetorius Department of Psychology University of Copenhagen Njalsgade 88 DK - 2300 Copenhagen S Denmark nini.praetorius@psy.ku.dk |
Abstract:
In my reply to Siiner and Hermann I hope to make clear
that although the principles argued for in my book may guide
psychology in determining what KIND of questions we may
meaningfully ask about our cognition, language and action - and
hope to answer - by empirical psychological investigations, neither
the principles nor their implications may in themselves serve as
answers to these questions in advance of such investigations.
Keywords: Psychological Theorising, Empirical Psychological Investigations, The Science of Psychology. |
| 13(023) | BASIC CONDITIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE AND DESCRIPTION OF REAL THINGS VS. FICTIONAL ENTITIES.
Reply to Hutto on Praetorius on Cognition-Action Nini Praetorius Department of Psychology University of Copenhagen Njalsgade 88 DK - 2300 Copenhagen S Denmark nini.praetorius@psy.ku.dk |
Abstract:
In his review, Hutto suggests that meaningful and true
claims about "fictional entities", and entities which in retrospect
prove to be "fictional", seem to question the generality of "the
principle of the correctness of knowledge and language". By sorting
out some misunderstandings of the "Correctness Principle", and
clarifying the conditions for description and knowledge of "real"
vs. "fictional" entities, I hope to show that the Correctness
Principle does indeed apply to knowledge and description of both
"real" and "fictional" entities.
Keywords: Cognition, Language, Reality, Facts, Fictional Entities, Conventions, Truth, History of Science, Scientific Theorising. |