| Title & Author | Abstract | |
|---|---|---|
| 3(15) | ON THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE
Target Article on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
Psychology can be based on plans, internally held images
of achievement that organize the stimulus-response links of
traditional psychology. The hierarchical structure of plans must be
produced, held, assigned priorities, and monitored. Consciousness
is the operation of the plan-executing mechanism, enabling behavior
to be driven by plans rather than immediate environmental
contingencies. The mechanism unpacks a single internally held idea
into a series of actions. New in this paper is the proposal that
language uses this mechanism for communication, unpacking an idea
into a series of articulatory acts. Language comprehension uses
the plan-monitoring mechanism to pack a series of linguistic events
into an idea. Recursive processing results from monitoring one's
own speech. Neurophysiologically, the planning mechanism is
identified with higher-order motor control.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(17) | ROBOTS NEED TO BE CONSCIOUS
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness John H. Andreae Dept of Electrical & Electronic Engineering University of Canterbury Christchurch New Zealand andreae@elec.canterbury.ac.nz |
Abstract:
This commentary supports Bridgeman's general thesis. I
promote the use of robot design and simulation in psychological
argument, and show that there are good engineering reasons for
trying to work out what is needed to build a robot that is aware of
what it is doing. Acceptance of Bridgeman's thesis that
consciousness is the operation of a plan-executing mechanism should
enable one to get down to the design of appropriate mechanisms for
making plans, storing them, executing them and monitoring them.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(18) | PLANS AND THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Reply to Andreae on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
If plans are to become the highest level of control in
nervous systems, it is important to think carefully about what they
imply. I suggested that there need be no box labelled
"consciousness" in the brain, because consciousness is the name we
give to the process of executing plans.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(19) | THE SOCIAL ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Horace Barlow Physiological Laboratory Downing St Cambridge CB2 3EG, UK AECP1@PHOENIX.CAMBRIDGE.AC.UK |
Abstract:
Bridgeman's article is important but is only a single
step in the right direction. It must also be accepted that the
complete psychology of an individual could only portray a shadow of
their full personality. It is the reportability of our plans that
makes links between individuals possible, and that it is the
consequences and characteristics of these links that complete our
personalities.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(20) | THE SOCIAL BOOTSTRAPPING OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
Reply to Barlow on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
Barlow (1992) has identified a crucial prerequisite for
self-consciousness. I concur with most of his commentary adding
only a few elaborations.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(21) | ON UNCONSCIOUS BABIES AND DREAMLESS SLEEP
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Richard Fielding Behavioural Sciences Unit University of Hong Kong. HRMRFIR@HKUCC.HKU.HK |
Abstract:
Bridgeman's plan unpacking hypothesis is attractive as an
explanation of consciousness but does not clearly address issues of
intent, development, and altered states of consciousness. An
elaboration focussing on these issues is needed.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(22) | THE ONTOGENY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Reply to Fielding on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
I first address some definitional issues then examine the
the marginal cases Fielding proffers as examples.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(23) | SOME COMMONSENSE ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Donald Laming University of Cambridge Department of Experimental Psychology Downing Street Cambridge, England CB2 3EB (0223)-333565 drjl@uk.ac.cam.phx |
Abstract:
Consciousness has been the subject of much
misunderstanding. Bridgeman (1992) offers a strategic insight when
he declares (2.9) "It is meaningless to look for a box labelled
"consciousness" in a brain model, or to try to localize it in the
brain's anatomy. The operations that make us conscious occur in the
context of controlling behavior." Nevertheless, his analysis is
neither so simple nor so natural as it might be. This commentary
reassembles the elements of the target article in a more compelling
interrelationship.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(24) | QUALIA AND MEMORY
Response to Laming on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
Laming (1992) identifies an ambiguity in my target
article, where I associate consciousness with two functions --
planning on one hand and episodic memory on the other. I clarify
these relationships by differentiating between the origin and the
functioning of consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(25) | FROM PLANS TO MEDIATED ACTIONS
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Jacob M.J. Murre MRC Applied Psychology Unit 15 Chaucer Road Cambridge CB2 2EF United Kingdom Jaap.Murre@MRC-APU.CAM.AC.UK |
Abstract:
We argue that evolution has supported a combinatorial
explosion in the possibilities for action in man as a result of
evolutionary pressure from three distinct sources: communication,
learning, and mediated action. The latter is intimately related to
language use and planning and hinges on the incorporation of plans
conveyed by others into once own actions. The individual
development of sophisticated planning ability is a complex process
of gradual internalization of sociocultural entities that come
increasingly to mediate actions. The most significant research
question concerns the process of mediation rather than the
structure of plans or other mediating entities and therefore
propose that mediated actions, rather than plans, occupy center
stage in psychology.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(26) | LANGUAGE AND PLANS IN THE ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Reply to Murre on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
In my target article I suggest that sequential
articulation of action and articulation of language arise from the
same mechanism. Murre's assertion of a "mediated action" linking
sophisticated language and planning creates more problems than it
solves.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(27) | PLANS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness William Noble Psychology Department University of New England Armidale, NSW, Australia wnoble@metz.une.oz.au (William Noble) |
Abstract:
Bridgeman's (1992) focus on planning as symptomatic of
human life makes good sense. The idea that consciousness is the
spin-off product of the execution of planned conduct also makes
sense. The argument, however, becomes convoluted regarding the
significance of language to the execution of plans. A system
already so well-organised as to be able to generate language as one
of its planned products should be able to deliver it neurally,
rather than have to engage the complexities of articulation,
acoustics, and phonetics. Also, the converse selective advantage
to that suggested may be true, the roots of behaviour that enables
signs to be used as symbols may lie in the withholding of plans.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(28) | LANGUAGE AND PLANNING: ONE MECHANISM OR TWO?
Reply to Noble on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
Noble suggests it would be more effective for
plan-monitoring and plan-executing mechanisms to connect with each
other directly, in the brain. I in fact hypothesized this
connectionin my article. Noble's statements about language are
accurate, but he has the phylogenetic developmental sequence the
wrong way around. My hypothesis that language and planning share
some of the same mechanisms requires that the two appear together
both in phylogenesis and in ontogenesis, and this seems to be what
occurs.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(32) | CONSCIOUSNESS, PLANS, AND LANGUAGE:
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness David M. Rosenthal Ph.D. Program in Philosophy City University of New York, Graduate School 33 West 42 Street, New York, NY 10036-8099, USA DROGC@CUNYVM.BITNET |
Abstract:
There is much in Bridgeman's account that I find
congenial and compelling, especially appealing is Bridgeman's
application of his thesis to the tie between consciousness and
language. Nonetheless, I want to raise some questions about whether
the tie he finds between plans and consciousness actually does
hold. Not all memory and attention is conscious. Although attention
and accessing of memories are required to execute plans, we need
not be at all conscious of the relevant states of memory and
attention. Nor need we be conscious of the objects that those acts
of attention and accessed memories are about. We need not
necessarily appeal to the executing of plans to explain the
important tie between language and consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(33) | CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY:
Reply to Rosenthal on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
Rosenthal makes assertions about what can and cannot
happen without being conscious. Although his distinctions are
informative, they do not substitute for data. We have little
precise information that differentiates the immediate feeling of
awareness, such as that possible for Korsakoff patients, from the
later episodic memory of conscious experience. Appeals to
introspection are useful starting points, but they are clearly are
not to be trusted in this context. Rosenthal also asks why
conscious thinking would be more efficacious than thinking that is
not conscious. The answer is that the whole armamentarium of
planning becomes available to conscious thought, together with
episodic memory and the linguistic mediation that goes along with
it.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(34) | CONSCIOUSNESS AND PLANNING:
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Max Velmans Department of Psychology Goldsmiths' College, University of London New Cross, London SE14 6NW. MLV@GOLD.LON.AC.UK |
Abstract:
Bridgeman's (1992) linkage of consciousness with planning
may be grouped with similar proposals by Popper (1972) and Mandler
(1975). But which, if any, of these proposals are correct? Before
an evaluation can be undertaken it is necessary to specify the
relationship of consciousness to any given candidate process
unambiguously. Bridgeman's thesis is that consciousness has some
special link with planning, however, the nature of this link is not
explicit. Only when this conceptual clarification has been achieved
will it be appropriate to turn to the question of whether
consciousness relates more closely to planning than to perception,
volition, choosing, remembering, responding, and so on.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(35) | CONSCIOUSNESS: WHAT'S THE USE?
Reply to Velmans on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
Velmans (1992) questions the necessity of consciousness
for mental functions, considering consciousness to be a state
rather than a process i.e. a result rather than a cause. If the
introspection of consciousness is the result of an episodic memory
system that engages plans, the question of function loses much of
its meaning. Only plan execution has a function, not its
concomitant consciousness. If this conception of consciousness is a
form of epiphenomenalism, so be it. Unlike the epiphenomenalism of
traditional philosophy of mind, this epiphenomenalism echoes a real
system with a real function. It is this epiphenomenon that defines
our mental life.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(36) | ESSENTIALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS:
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Gerald S. Wasserman Dept. of Psychological Sciences Purdue University West Lafayette IN 47907-1364 codelab@psych.purdue.edu |
Abstract:
Brigman's idea about the evolution of consciousness is
attractive firstly because it postulates that consciousness is the
product of a seamless evolutionary path which began with
fundamental mechanisms and secondly because human language is
presented as a continuation along this path. However, the idea is
less an explanation of consciousness than it is an interpretation
of some of the essential properties of consciousness. I would urge
that our rapidly advancing knowledge of the neural mechanisms
described by Bridgeman should lead us to see them as a good place
to search for the roots of consciousness, rather than as an answer
to the problem of consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(37) | ON DEFINING CONSCIOUSNESS:
Reply to Wasserman on Bridgeman Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
Just about everything that Wasserman (1992) says is
important and accurate. Perhaps, following Wasserman's strategic
advice, the best course at present is to concentrate on tracking
down plans in the hope that this leads eventually to the several
forms of consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(38) | THE DISSOCIATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
AND THE CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Philip David Zelazo Dept. of Psychology Yale University P.O. Box 11A Yale Station New Haven, CT 06520 zelphid@yalevm.bitnet |
Abstract:
There is clearly a relation between consciousness and
planned action, this has been recognised since the time of
Aristotle. Many of our plans are conscious; the execution of those
plans often requires conscious activity, and much of our conscious
activity is involved in the goal-directed control of action. In so
far as he attempts to explain the phylogenetic evolution of
consciousness, Bridgeman seems to be looking in the right place; an
account of the evolution of consciousness that emphasizes its
connection to behavioral consequences. The assimilation of
communication to planned behavior more generally would also seem to
be promising. However, there are a number of reasons to believe
that the connections that lie at the crux of Bridgeman's account
are less straightforward than he caimss.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(39) | THE CO-DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PLANNING
Reply to Zelazo on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Dept. of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 (408) 459-4005 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
Zelazo claims the target article fails to differentiate
between planning and the executions of plans, on the other. These
two concepts are in fact differentiated along with other stages.
Zelazo identifies a further ambiguity: executing plans cannot be
synonymous with consciousness if plans can sometimes be executed
without the experience of consciousness. I agree, the memory for
conscious experience requires storing the event in an episodic
memory. Zelazo's second line of reasoning differentiating planning
and consciousness is the data on executive functions, showing that
having a conscious plan does not necessarily mean being able to
execute it. I agree that the interrelationships among the
influences I descibe are less straightforward than those described
in the target article, which represents only a start in this
direction.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(41) | WOULD YOU CHOOSE UNREMEMBERED PAIN?
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Steven Reidbord Department of Psychiatry Box CSN-0984 UCSF San Francisco CA 94143 reidbord@macpsy.ucsf.edu |
Abstract:
Bridgeman appears to equate epistemology with ontology,
but these are different issues. While memory recall may be needed
to know or PROVE conscious experience, it does not COMPRISE
conscious experience. Conscious experience matters greatly even in
the absence of the memory needed to prove that it occurred. An
account of consciousness must not establish an epistemology so
stringent that ontology gets lost in the process.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system. |
| 3(42) | VARIETIES OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE
Reply to Reidbord on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Department of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
The immediacy of current awareness or sentience runs up
against a paradox of time: that the present is a moving knife-edge
with no duration and therefore no content. Even the simplest
stimuli and the most direct neural events require time to be coded.
The psychological present must therefore extend into the past. Our
feeling of rich awareness escapes the paradox by using a working
memor. The contrast between the properties of this memory and the
long-term episodic memory creates the contrast between immediate
and reflective consciousness. Conscious experience and memory are
inextricably intertwined from start to finish. Experience requires
memory and is made meaningful by other memory. And different
aspects of consciousness are supported by different kinds of memory
with distinct neurological organizations.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(43) | CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Horace Barlow Physiological Laboratory Downing St Cambridge CB2 3EG, UK AECP1@PHOENIX.CAMBRIDGE.AC.UK |
Abstract:
Bridgeman agrees that consciousness is bootstrapped by
other brains but he argues that it then becomes autonomous and
hence that it is possible to examine it in a single brain. If one
does so one should be aware that the method can tell one little or
nothing about important aspects of the object of study, which stems
from the fact that the most important aspect of consciousness is
that it is the medium through which the social culture within which
we live is transmitted and developed. If you study consciousness in
an isolated brain, you will be studying a biological phenomenon
divorced from its extraordinarily potent role in our evolution.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(47) | CONSCIOUSNESS CONFOUNDED
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Katharine McGovern & Bernard J. Baars The Wright Institute Berkeley, CA 94710 baars@bayes.stanford.edu |
Abstract:
Bridgeman's effort to say something new or useful about
consciousness and language is flawed. His major theoretical
construct, the "plan," on which he depends to develop his arguments
is defined in at least four different ways. Consciousness, which is
variously described as the operation of the plan-executing
mechanism or the outcome of its operation, is relegated to a purely
epiphenomenal status with no psychological functions ascribed to
it. Finally, Bridgeman's discussion of perception as deriving from
the "plan-monitoring mechanism" leaves much that is known about
perception unaccounted for.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(48) | CONSCIOUSNESS AND SIMULATION
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness Neil W. Rickert Department of Computer Science Northern Illinois University DeKalb, IL 60115 rickert@cs.niu.edu |
Abstract:
Bridgeman (1992) has presented some interesting ideas
about the nature of consciousness. I discuss them from a
computational point of view, but the concept of consciousness is
difficult to grasp, so I will phrase my comments in terms of
thought rather than consciousness, since there is at the very
least, a strong relationship between the two.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system, computer science, artificial intelligence, thought. |
| 3(50) | MENTAL LIFE AS SIMULATION
Reply to Rickert on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
The idea of brain processes as simulations can unify the
interpretation of a number of seemingly diverse mental functions.
Rickert (1992) proposes to extend the idea of planning to trying
out ideas, even in the absence of "a coherent plan." Plans need not
be coherent or even rational. They need only include a sequence of
actions determined in advance. The idea of thinking as simulation
is consistent with my original conception, and extends it in a
useful direction.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(53) | PLANNING TO PLAN: ITERATIVE BRAIN FUNCTION
Reply to McGovern/Baars on Bridgeman on Consciousness Bruce Bridgeman Department of Psychology Kerr Hall UCSC Santa Cruz, Ca. 95064 bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu |
Abstract:
I defined a plan as an internally held image of an
intended achievement. The plan can then control a sequence of
actions to achieve a goal. This property of plans is not
inconsistent with the definition. I also pointed out that plans
motivate behavior. Again, there is no inconsistency, just an
elaboration. McGovern and Baars ask whether we decide unconsciously
which of several plans might be used to achieve a goal. The answer
is, yes: plans pop into our heads like the "aha" phenomenon of
Gestalt psychology. There is an iterative process, however, that
can use internal speech to develop plans. If consciousness is a
result of the planning mechanisms at work, then the functions of
consciousness are the functions of plans and planning. In my
interpretation, the perception of sequences is handled not by the
plan-executing (motor) mechanism, but by a separate plan-monitoring
(sensory) mechanism that functions both to monitor one's own
progress in a plan and to interpret sequences of outside events.
Simpler perceptions become conscious to the degree that they engage
the working memory needed to consolidate sensory events into
interpreted experiences.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |
| 3(54) | HAS CONSCIOUSNESS BECOME A SOLUBLE PROBLEM?
Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness J. T. Enright Neurobiology Unit, A-002 Scripps Institution of Oceanography University of California La Jolla, CA. 92093 (619) 534-3784 jenright@ucsd.edu |
Abstract:
Bridgeman (1992) advocates "a new psychology of plans,"
however, the time is not yet ripe for a frontal attack on the
problem of consciousness, the necessary tools and insights are not
yet available and the problem is not yet tractable. Bridgeman
mentions several regions of the brain where he proposes that plans
are synthesized, modified and executed, but how might one recognize
in those areas the plan-executing events that constitute
consciousness, and distinguish them from other unconscious forms of
information processing? With what alternative possibilities should
the hypothesized mechanism be confronted, in order to design
critical experiments? If no answers are forthcoming this new
definition leaves consciousness as a problem that is, at present,
just as intractable as before. And so psychologists and
neurophysiologists will, I think, continue for some time yet to
chip away at the edges of the consciousness problem.
Keywords: consciousness, language, plans, motivation, evolution, motor system |