| Title & Author | Abstract | |
|---|---|---|
| 4(52) | DENNETT ON THE SPLIT-BRAIN
Target Article by Dennet on Split-Brain Roland Puccetti Philosophy Department Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia CANADA DALPHIL@ac.dal.ca |
Abstract:
In "Consciousness Explained," Dennett (1991) denies that
split-brain humans have double consciousness: he describes the
experiments as "anecdotal." In attempting to replace the Cartesian
"Theatre of the Mind" with his own "Multiple Drafts" view of
consciousness, Dennett rejects the notion of the mind as a
countable thing in favour of its being a mere "abstraction." His
criticisms of the standard interpretation of the split-brain data
are analyzed here and each is found to be open to objections. There
exist people who have survived left ["dominant"] cerebral
hemispherectomy; by Dennett's criteria, they would not have minds.
Keywords: cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain. |
| 4(57) | A NEW AGENDA FOR STUDYING CONSCIOUSNESS
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain Valerie Gray Hardcastle Department of Philosophy Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0126 U.S.A. valerieh@vtvm1.cc.vt.edu |
Abstract:
I support Puccetti's arguments and conclusions by
providing some additional evidence that Dennett's position with
respect to split-brains is untenable. I also suggest that these
considerations highlight the need to pay more attention to brain
activity as the criterion for consciousness.
Keywords: cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain. |
| 4(58) | CONSCIENCE AND COMMISSUROTOMY
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain Justin Leiber Philosophy Department University of Houston Houston TX 77004. PHIL4@Jetson.UH.EDU |
Abstract:
Puccetti confounds more or less countable brain parts
with the functions they more or less subserve. Neonates whose left
hemisphere is removed develop language and consciousness in the
right hemisphere. Elderly people who suffer the same procedure
generally do not. Despite Puccetti's claims, our moral intuitions
about the latter are better served by Dennett's theory than by the
alternative.
Keywords: cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain. |
| 4(59) | DENNETT AND DISSOCIATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain Antti Revonsuo Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Neuroscience University of Turku FIN-20500 Turku FINLAND REVONSUO@sara.utu.fi |
Abstract:
I concur with Puccetti's criticism and argue that
Dennett's multiple drafts theory cannot help us to understand any
kinds of dissociations of consciousness. This is because the theory
does not allow the distinction between real and apparent streams of
consciousness. Such a distinction can be made on empirical grounds,
however, with the help of empirically based accounts of consciousness.
Keywords: cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain. |
| 4(62) | DISTINCTIONS: SUBPERSONAL AND SUBCONSCIOUS
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain Chris Mortensen, Gerard O'Brien & Belinda Paterson Department of Philosophy University of Adelaide North Terrace, South Australia 5001 Australia cmortens@chomsky.adelaide.edu.au gobrien@chomsky.adelaide.edu.au |
Abstract:
Puccetti argues that Dennett's views on split brains are
defective. First, we criticise Puccetti's argument. Then we
distinguish persons, minds, consciousnesses, selves and
personalities. Then we introduce the concepts of part-persons and
part-consciousnesses, and apply them to clarifying the situation.
Finally, we criticise Dennett for some contribution to the confusion.
Keywords: cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain. |
| 4(64) | ONE MIND TOO MANY?
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain Andrew Pessin Department of Philosophy College of William and Mary Williamsburg, VA 23185 awpess@mail.wm.edu |
Abstract:
In this commentary I note that Dennett's Multiple Drafts
theory is not incompatible with the "potential duality of mind" in
normal subjects or split-brain patients. I then argue that if we
acknowledge the slippery slope of selfhood that Multiple Drafts
encourages, we can see how Puccetti's criticisms of Dennett's three
"arguments" miss the mark.
Keywords: cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain. |
| 5(18) | NARRATIVE RICHNESS AS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE SELF
Reply to Hardcastle, Leiber, Mortensen et al., Pessin & Revonsuo on Puccetti on Split Brain Roland Puccetti Philosophy Department Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada DALPHIL@ac.dal.ca |
Abstract:
Hardcastle supports my claim that Dennett's criterion for
conscious selfhood -- having a robust narrative center of gravity
--is counterintuitively narrow. Revonsuo provides strong empirical
evidence in favor of this same view. Leiber suggests that my
defence of right-hemisphere self-consciousness depends upon my
accepting mind-brain identity theory, but this is incorrect.
Mortensen et al. think I need their notion of "part-persons" to
describe the disconnected cerebral hemispheres: I find it simpler
to extend the notion of "person" to the nonspeaking hemisphere,
yielding two persons per split-brain patient. Pessin's main
critical reaction rests on a confusion about Dennett's "Multiple
Drafts" theory of the mind.
Keywords: cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain. |
| 5(22) | Collingwood and Vygotsky on Consciousness
Commentary on Puccetti on Split-brain David S. Webster Department of Psychology University of Durham Durham, UK D.S.Webster@durham.ac.uk |
Abstract:
Both Collingwood and Vygotsky take consciousness to be
the reflexive consequence of the structure of activity. The most
important activity related to human consciousness is speech -- the
source of narrative consciousness. Dennett's "multiple drafts" may
be best understood as an aspect of the reflexivity of speech.
Puccetti is right about the dangers of placing too much emphasis on
"narrative richness" as a criterion for personhood and thereby, the
right to life.
Keywords: cartesianism, cell death, cerebral dominance, consciousness, hemispherectomy, lateralization, mental duality, mental unity, multiple drafts, split brain. |