| Title & Author | Abstract | |
|---|---|---|
| 7(14) | NAIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE INVERTED TURING TEST
Target Article by West on Turing Test Stuart Watt Department of Psychology The Open University Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, UK. MK7 6AA s.n.k.watt@open.ac.uk |
Abstract:
This target article argues that the Turing test
implicitly rests on a "naive psychology," a naturally evolved
psychological faculty which is used to predict and understand the
behaviour of others in complex societies. This natural faculty is
an important and implicit bias in the observer's tendency to
ascribe mentality to the system in the test. The paper analyses the
effects of this naive psychology on the Turing test, both from the
side of the system and the side of the observer, and then proposes
and justifies an inverted version of the test which allows the
processes of ascription to be analysed more directly than in the
standard version.
Keywords: False belief tests, folk psychology, naive psychology, the "other minds" problem, theory of mind, the Turing test. |
| 7(15) | THE TURING TEST AS A SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENT
Commentary on Watt on Turing-Test Ariella Popple Psychology Department Durham University Durham DH1 3LE England A.V.Popple@dur.ac.uk |
Abstract:
Watt (1996) suggests that the conventional Turing Test for
artificial intelligence be replaced with an Inverted Test which
requires the machine to mimic human naive psychology, that faculty
which predisposes us to anthropomorphism and enables us to ascribe
intelligence to others. This suggestion would be valid if the test
were viewed as a single court case, but not when it is seen as a
replicable experiment.
Keywords: False belief tests, folk psychology, naive psychology, the "other minds" problem, theory of mind, the Turing test. |
| 7(20) | A SCIENTIFIC TURING TEST?
Reply to Popple on Turing-Test Stuart Watt Department of Psychology The Open University Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, UK. MK7 6AA. s.n.k.watt@open.ac.uk |
Abstract:
Popple (1996) argues that the inverted Turing test should
be seen as a replicable scientific experiment. I suggest that while
the research method this implies may be appropriate, the Turing
test itself should not be seen as a scientific test.
Keywords: False belief tests, folk psychology, naive psychology, the "other minds" problem, theory of mind, the Turing test. |
| 7(29) | THE INVERTED TURING TEST IS PROVABLY REDUNDANT
Reply to Watt on Turing-Test Selmer Bringsjord Dept. of Philosophy, Psychology & Cognitive Science Department of Computer Science Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, NY 12180 (USA) http://www.rpi.edu/~brings selmer@rpi.edu |
Abstract:
Watt's (1996) Inverted Turing Test (ITT) is probably
redundant: it is easily shown to be entailed by the original
Turing Test (TT). And, contra Watt, that which suggests ITT --
naive psychology -- is something already withering in many humans
(e.g., Bringsjord). Indeed, before long, I predict this property
will be moribund across the planet.
Keywords: False belief tests, folk psychology, naive psychology, the "other minds" problem, theory of mind, the Turing test. |
| 7(37) | THE EXISTENCE-IN-PRINCIPLE OF THE ROSETTA STONE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSCIOUSNESS Commentary on Bringsjord on Turing-Test Ariella V. Popple Department of Psychology University of Durham Science Laboratories Durham DH1 3LE United Kingdom A.V.Popple@dur.ac.uk |
Abstract:
Bringsjord (1996) suggests that naive psychology will
vanish when we become unsure whether our netscape correspondents
are human or just a bag of tricks. This pessimism, which stems from
his assertion that humans are not automata, may necessitate
allowing humans to contravene the laws of physics. Recent
developments associating thermodynamics with information theory
anticipate that contemporary quandaries about mind and brain may one
day become as incomprehensible as the idea that Egyptologists once
argued about the existence-in-principle of the Rosetta stone.
Keywords: False belief tests, folk psychology, naive psychology, the "other minds" problem, theory of mind, the Turing test. |
| 7(39) | THE INVERTED TURING TEST: A SIMPLE
(MINDLESS) PROGRAM THAT COULD PASS IT Commentary on Watt on Turing-Test Robert M. French Department of Psychology (B32) University of Liege Liege, Belgium french@segi.ulg.ac.be |
Abstract:
This commentary attempts to show that Watt's (1996)
inverted Turing Test could be simulated by a standard Turing Test;
indeed, a very simple program with no intelligence whatsoever could
be written that would pass the inverted Turing Test. For this
reason, the inverted Turing Test must be rejected.
Keywords: False belief tests, folk psychology, naive psychology, the "other minds" problem, theory of mind, the Turing test. |
| 7(43) | THE TURING TEST IS JUST AS BAD WHEN INVERTED
Commentary on Watt on Turing-Test Kenneth M. Ford and Patrick J. Hayes Institute for Human and Machine Cognition University of West Florida http://www.coginst.uwf.edu/~kford/ http://www.coginst.uwf.edu/~phayes/ kford@ai.uwf.edu phayes@cs.uiuc.edu |
Abstract:
Watt discusses some of the problems with the original
Turing Test (Watt, 1996), but he misses the central ones. His
"inverted" test (where the machine plays the role of the judge) is
even more vulnerable to all the criticisms of the original Test,
and provides no clear conceptual advantage or insight. Similarity
to human behavior is not a sensible criterion for intelligence. As
we have argued elsewhere in some detail (Hayes & Ford, 1995),
although the Turing Test had a historical role in getting our
subject started, it is now a burden, damaging AI's public
reputation and its own intellectual coherence. It is time for AI to
consciously reject the naive anthropomorphism implicit in all such
"imitation games," and adopt a more mature description of its aims.
Keywords: False belief tests, folk psychology, naive psychology, the "other minds" problem, theory of mind, the Turing test. |
| 8(01) | THE EDITING TEST FOR THE DEEP PROBLEM OF AI
Commentary on Watt on Turing-Test H. M. Collins Centre for the Study of Knowledge, Expertise & Science Department of Sociology and Social Policy University of Southampton Southampton SO17 1BJ UK +44 (0)1703 592578 FAX 593859 h.m.Collins@soton.ac.uk |
Abstract:
All the problems of AI are surface transformations of one
deep problem: how to make a computer that can learn from its
surroundings, including social surroundings, in the same way that
humans learn. The Turing Test can be adapted to check whether or
not the deep problem has been solved by looking at one of its
surface transformations -- the problem of "interpretative
asymmetry." Interpretative asymmetry refers to the skillful way in
which humans "repair" deficiencies in speech, written texts,
handwriting, etc., and the failure of computers to achieve the same
interpretative competence. Short passages of typed text are quite
enough to reveal interpretative asymmetry, and therefore a
Turing-like test, turning on the differential ability to sub-edit
such short passages, is sufficient to reveal whether the deep
problem of AI has been solved.
Keywords: False belief tests, folk psychology, naive psychology, the "other minds" problem, theory of mind, the Turing test. |