Zelazo claims the target article fails to differentiate between planning and the executions of plans, on the other. These two concepts are in fact differentiated along with other stages. Zelazo identifies a further ambiguity: executing plans cannot be synonymous with consciousness if plans can sometimes be executed without the experience of consciousness. I agree, the memory for conscious experience requires storing the event in an episodic memory. Zelazo's second line of reasoning differentiating planning and consciousness is the data on executive functions, showing that having a conscious plan does not necessarily mean being able to execute it. I agree that the interrelationships among the influences I descibe are less straightforward than those described in the target article, which represents only a start in this direction.
1.2 In his para. 1.4, Zelazo identifies an ambiguity also found by some other commentators: executing plans cannot be synonymous with consciousness if plans can sometimes be executed without the experience of consciousness. True, there is another step which I glossed over in the target article, that the memory for conscious experience requires storing the event in an episodic memory, a memory which exists only in the service of conscious functions. This is discussed in my responses (Bridgeman 1992b,c) to Fielding (1992) and Laming (1992). It is possible that an event would be judged as conscious at the time, only to be denied later (see reply to Rosenthal 1992; Bridgeman 1992d) because of failure to engage a long-term episodic memory. So two things are necessary for reflective consciousness: executing a plan, and storing that event in memory where it can be described later by language.
1.3 Later, Zelazo offers a counterexample to the relation of planning and consciousness, in the possibility of "aimless free association." He offers introspection as evidence. But the empirical evidence is different -- when people are asked to engage in such association, their productions are anything but aimless, as we have known since the time of Freud. When performing such an activity, people of course engage a plan to produce a series of unrelated words. Other empirical evidence comes from a related task of asking subjects to produce a string of random numbers. The results are anything but random: consecutive repetitions of digits occur much less frequently than randomness would predict, and one hardly sees random snatches that seem orderly, such as 2 or 3 digits in their proper order (23 or 789), although these will occur from time to time in truly random sequences. So the empirical evidence contradicts the introspection, another example of the danger of relying on that seductive but dangerous technique.
1.4 Zelazo's second line of reasoning differentiating planning and consciousness is the data on executive functions, showing that having a conscious plan does not necessarily mean being able to execute it. He offers some fascinating empirical evidence, reminiscent of that from Vygotskii (1962) and Luria (1981), that young children can verbally articulate a plan but cannot execute it. Have they really got an action plan, or only a verbal expression? I would argue that they have not yet acquired the ability to translate a verbal plan into an action plan through the parallel-serial-parallel internal feedback loop of internal speech, using their plan to speak as a contribution to producing a plan to act. Luria notes intermediate cases of failure of verbal mediation, where at one stage children can successfully use the verbal mediation "press" to squeeze on a bulb, but if asked to repeat "don't press," they cannot resist pressing anyway. It is not until the verbal and action aspects of planning are linked that the true power of action planning becomes possible. When mature, the action plan can be informed by social influences, the speech of others, and one's own internal speech. I do agree that the interrelationships among these influences are less straightforward than those described in the target article, which represents only a start in this direction.
Bridgeman, Bruce (1992a) On the Evolution of Consciousness and Language. PSYCOLOQUY 3(15) consciousness.1
Bridgeman, Bruce (1992b) The Ontogeny of Consciousness: Reply to Fielding on Bridgeman on Consciousness PSYCOLOQUY 3(22) consciousness.7
Bridgeman, Bruce (1992c) Qualia and Memory: Response to Laming on Bridgeman on Consciousness. PSYCOLOQUY 3(24) consciousness.9
Bridgeman, Bruce (1992d) Consciousness and Memory: Reply to Rosenthal on Bridgeman on Consciousness. PSYCOLOQUY 3(33) consciousness.15
Laming, D. (1992) Some Commonsense About Consciousness: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness. PSYCOLOQUY 3(23) consciousness.8
Luria, A. R. (1981) Language and Cognition. Ed. and translated by J.
Fielding, R. (1992) On Unconscious Babies and Dreamless Sleep: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness. PSYCOLOQUY 3(21) consciousness.6
Rosenthal, D. (1992) Consciousness, Plans, and Language: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness. PSYCOLOQUY 3(32) consciousness.14
Vygotskii, L. S. (1962) Thought and language. Ed. and translated by E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Zelazo, Philip D. (1992) The Dissociation of Consciousness and the Control of Behavior: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness. PSYCOLOQUY 3(38) consciousness.20